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This report aims to reach a final valuation on The Walt Disney Company. In this report, 
the Park, Experiences & Products and Studio Entertainment segments will be analyzed 
in detail. As well as a Macroeconomics analysis, a breakdown of company's capital 
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Company Overview 
The Walt Disney Company has built a diverse empire since its beginning in the 
1920s, creating a considerable range of lucrative products in several 
marketplaces. As the largest mass media conglomerate in the world, Disney is 
best known for its film and TV productions, theme parks and the recent addition 
of Disney+ and Hulu to their portfolio. Together with its subsidiaries, Disney is a 
diversified worldwide entertainment company with operations in four business 
segments: Media Networks; Parks, Experiences and Products (PE&P); Studio 
Entertainment; and Direct-to-Consumer & International (DTCI). 
Parks Experiences and Products 
Business Model  
Under this business segment, TWDC operates six theme parks, recording 156 
million ticket sales in 2019 around the world (Figure 1) (Figure 2), which include 
The Walt Disney World Resort in Florida, Disneyland Resort in California, 
Disneyland Paris, as well as ownership interest in resorts in Hong Kong (48%) and 
Shanghai (43%). 
Additionally, it operates Tokyo Disney Resort through an intellectual property 
license agreement with a third party. Furthermore, the Company manages several 
experiences, including 15 resorts, expeditions and adventures, all part of Disney 
Vacation Club. 
Moreover, Disney has a four-ship vacation cruise line, the Disney Magic, Disney 
Wonder, Disney Dream and the Disney Fantasy, which operates out of ports in 
North America and Europe. The ships cater to families, children, teenagers and 
adults, with distinctly themed areas and activities for each group. Many cruise 
vacations include a visit to Disney’s Castaway Cay, a 405-ha private Bahamian 
island. The Company is expanding its cruise business by adding three new ships. 
The first ship, the Disney Wish, is scheduled to launch in the summer of 2022 with 
the other two ships to be delivered from the shipyard in 2024 and 2025. These 
dates include impacts from shipyard delays due to Covid-19.  
Consumer Products also represent a substantial share in this segment, which 
includes licensing of merchandise, such as toys, games, home décor, accessories, 
books and consumer electronics. Some of the major properties licensed by the 
Company include: Mickey and Minnie, Frozen, Star Wars, Disney Princess and 
Avengers. TWDC also sells Disney, Marvel, Pixar and Lucasfilm branded products 
through retail stores and internet sites globally. 
Regarding this business unit, revenue comes mainly from selling theme park 
admissions, food, beverages, and resort vacation stays (Figure 3). Merchandise 
Figure 1 - 2019 attendance of each Disney Park, in 
millions.  
Source: AECOM; Themed Entertainment Association. 
Figure 2 - Change in Disney’s Parks annual attendance, 
in millions. 
Source: AECOM; Themed Entertainment Association 
Figure 3 - Parks, Experiences and Products 2019 Revenue 
Distribution. 
Source: TWDC Annual Report, 2019. 
licensing and sales through their theme parks, cruises, resorts, retail stores and 
online stores also represents a significant income in this segment. Disney also 
manages real estate, such as the ESPN Wide World of Sports Complex (in 
Florida’s park) which in 2020 hosted the remainder of the NBA season. Operating 
expenses consists primarily of operating labor (70% of their workforce is 
concentrated in this segment) (Figure 4), costs of goods sold, infrastructure costs, 
supplies, commissions, entertainment offerings and depreciation. It is also 
important to notice that, over 70% of the Company’s capital spend has been in this 
segment, which is mostly for theme park and resort expansion, new attractions, 
cruise ships, capital improvements and systems infrastructure. 
Theme parks traditionally have served as the reliable cash cow for TWDC. When 
the studios or cable networks faltered, the theme parks have been there to keep 
the company in the black. However, with the pandemic closing parks and largely 
keeping fans away from ones that have reopened, we are now observing other 
segments supporting the company. 
Market Overview and Competitors 
The theme park industry started in the US in 1955, and Disney was the first 
company to take a step in this direction (Figure 5). This sector (quite capital-
intensive) has evolved considerably in the last decades, and today it is an industry 
of billions of dollars and that attracts people worldwide. 
The industry is matured in developed economies, being dominated by a small 
group of companies with marketing expertise and with the necessary capital to 
renew and constantly improve their attractions/facilities, thus constituting an entry 
barrier for new players. Regardless of location, the degree of ultimate success will 
always have as much to do with intangible elements, quality of design, efficiency 
of service and public fancy, as with anything else (Vogel, 2011). 
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, it is believed that theme parks' short-term plan will 
not be to maximize the number of visits to their parks, due to the restrictions 
imposed by governments, in addition to the increased fear of public that frequents 
these spaces of large agglomerations. At the same time, we will see a new ticket 
price model being implemented (Figure 6), a dynamic model that will take into 
account the day of the week, for example, and which will vary according to the 
number of attractions that the customer wishes to attend. This will allow customers 
to be reorganized and "spread" more efficiently, avoiding large concentrations of 
visitors during high season, giving those who can afford a better experience, while 
improving margins. 
Therefore, big players are betting on attractions where the public will be more 
connected and more involved in the experience that is going to a theme park, thus 
creating in them the desire to pay more, for something that creates a more 
immersive and exclusive experience. Disney has become a pioneer in dynamic 
Figure 4 - Disney’s employees distributed by segment.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 5 - Original Disney tickets from 1955.  
Source: Insider.com 
Figure 6 - Disney average ticket price, in dollars.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
ticket pricing, with the theme park industry largely beginning to follow in its 
footsteps. 
Furthermore, around 15% of this segment’s revenue comes from their hotel and 
resort stays (Figure 7). In 2019, this industry has presented a revenue of $220 bn 
in the US alone, with an average daily rate of $131 and an occupancy rate of 67% 
(below Disney’s rate of 87% in the same period) (Figure 8). Furthermore, in recent 
years, more and more people across the globe have begun to see travel as an 
integral part of life. Leisure travel spending has seen year-over-year growth over 
the past five years (CAGR of 4,6%). The hotel industry's market size has also 
benefited from this influx of travelers seeing consistent YoY growth of 4,3%. 
Disney is also present in the cruise industry, which represents around 8% of 
segment’s revenue. This market has generated an estimated revenue of $45 bn in 
2018, worldwide, a value which has grown by $15 bn over the last half decade 
(CAGR of 5% during this period). The industry made significant recovery after 
revenue fell below $25 bn during the 2009 global recession (Figure 9). 
While the theme park, hotel and cruise industries have shown growth over the last 
decade, 2020 was a terrible year for companies operating in these markets. This 
was a direct result of the coronavirus pandemic, with the implementation of travel 
restrictions to curb the spread of the disease, international and domestic tourism 
came to a halt (Figure 10). Due to the consequences of this pandemic, this sector 
saw its revenues decrease by 86% and 61%, in 2nd and 3rd quarter of the previous 
fiscal year (Figure 11), contributing to a negative FCF (which will be addressed in 
the final chapter of this segment’s analysis). 
Major competitors to TWDC can be found in industries like entertainment and 
leisure, such as theme parks, resorts and cruise lines businesses. 
Regarding the theme parks, Walt Disney Attractions are by far the most visited 
amusement facilities in the World, with a 30% market share in 2019 (Figure 12), 
followed by privately-owned companies, such as, OTC Parks, Fantawild Group and 
Chimelong Group all three of them being Chinese Amusement Parks, Merlin 
Entertainment in the UK and Parque Reunidos in Spain. This leaves us with four 
public US companies, Universal Parks & Resorts, Six Flags, Cedar Entertainment 
and SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment. The latter will be given a more detailed 
analysis as we have more information to scrutinize.  
Universal parks & resorts is best known for attractions and lands based on famous 
classic and modern pop culture properties from not only NBCUniversal (owned by 
Comcast), but also third-party companies, for all of its parks. In August 2020, a 
report released by Deutsche Bank revealed that the Universal Orlando theme park 
had surpassed Disney World Resort in total attendance, amid coronavirus. 
(Bloomberg, 2020) 
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation owns and operates regional theme and 
Figure 7 - Hotels and Cruises contribution to segment's 
revenue.  
Source: TWDC annual report, 2020. 
Figure 8 - Hotel Occupancy rates by geographical 
region.  
Source: Global Hotel Review, Page 2. 
Figure 10 - Hotel and Cruise occupancy rates and parks 
attendance, 2017-2020. 
Source: TWDC annual report, 2020. 
Figure 9 - Number of cruise ship passengers 2009-2020.  
Source: Statista through Cruise Industry Outlook 2020. 
waterparks. The company's parks offer various thrill rides, water attractions, 
themed areas, concerts and shows, restaurants, game venues, and retail outlets. 
Cedar Fair, together with its subsidiaries, owns twelve theme parks, four outdoor 
water parks, one indoor water park and five hotels in the United States and Canada.  
SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment owns and operates twelve recreational 
destinations in the United States, including seven theme parks and five water 
parks. 
We have also found interesting and relevant to compare this business segment to 
the biggest (in terms of Market Cap., Revenues and guests/passengers) publicly 
owned companies in the hospitality and cruise line industries.  
Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. is a multinational hospitality company, that 
manages and franchises a broad portfolio of hotels and resorts. As of June 2020, 
its portfolio includes around six thousand properties with one million rooms in more 
than one hundred countries.  
Carnival Corporation & Plc is a cruise line company that provides vacations to 
various destinations, operating several hotels and lodges as well. 
Finally, we must not disregard local competition from other corporations, for 
example, smaller hotels, oceanariums, resorts, basically companies operating in 
the hospitality sector, leisure activities and vacation related activities. 
Drivers 
In order to obtain the most realistic and complete forecast possible, theme park 
admissions, and resort and vacation revenue, the two main sources of revenue in 
this segment, had to be dissected as much as possible. 
Theme park admissions was calculated through the individual analysis of each one 
of the six parks that Disney owns (considering that Disney only owns 48% of Hong 
Kong’s park, 43% of Shanghai’s park and receives royalties from the Japanese 
park). Firstly, we need to look at previous attendance levels and growth for each 
park. In 2020, we observed an attendance decrease of 49% in each park, on 
average, so from 2021 to 2022 we are taking into account that we will observe a 
process of gradual normalization in relation to the number of visits, which we 
believe it will only return to the pre-Covid levels by the end of 2022 (Figure 13) and 
from that moment we apply the growth rate of the population of around 30 years of 
age in each of the respective (parks) geographic areas, as we believe it is the driver 
that better reflects the typical ticket buyer. We were able to get the average ticket 
price by dividing the Theme Park admissions by total attendance, and for 
forecasted years the expected inflation for each geography was applied (in more 
recent years, due to the change in their price strategy, from the current model to 
the more price heavy/dynamic model they plan on implementing, ticket prices will 
increase above inflation) (Figure 14). 
Regarding Tokyo’s park, the process was different, as we had to take into 
Figure 11 - PE&P revenues in millions and COVID cases.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 12 - Top 10 of the most visited theme parks in 2019.  
Source: Statista through Theme / Museum Index 2019. 
Figure 13 - Projected Parks' total admissions.  
Source: Analyst Estimates 
Figure 14 - Evolution of revenues, exclusively from parks 
admissions, in billions of dollars.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
consideration that under the licensing agreement that Disney reached with OLC 
group in 1979, OLC agreed to pay 10% of its admission revenues and 5% of its 
food and souvenir revenues as royalty to Disney. 
Regarding the second biggest stream of revenue in this segment, resorts and 
vacations, the sales from resort stays and cruise passes must be forecasted. In 
respect to resorts and hotels revenue, in the annual report we have the information 
regarding “Occupancy Rate”, “Available Room Nights” and “Per Room Guest 
Spending”, so this process of forecasting was fairly simple, as we applied the 
inflation rate to the average spending. Lastly, we presented the same assumption 
that we will not see the same level of attendance pre-Covid before 2023, assuming 
a gradual increase during that time (Figure 15). For the cruise line forecast, the 
method was similar, as it depends on the capacity of each ship, the occupancy rate 
and the average price per night. Currently, Disney owns four cruise ships (Dream, 
Magic, Wonder and Fantasy ships), and three ships will join the fleet in 2022, 2024, 
and 2025. It should be noted that the occupancy rate of Disney cruises has 
exceeded 100%, through a more efficient management strategy to support greater 
demand in the summer and winter vacation months (which is common in this 
industry) (Figure 16). 
Margins, Rates and Assets & Liabilities 
In terms of margins, this segment will not see drastic changes, and as mentioned 
earlier, having reached maturity, profitability levels will converge to the pre-covid 
years. Still, it should be noted that the fact that Disney is betting on the 
implementation of the new pricing model will cause ROIC to see slight 
improvements (from 18% in 2019 to 22% in 2025) (Table 1), values far above the 
respective WACC, thus maintaining its cash-cow status that creates value both in 
the short and long term. 
As a sector that needs constant and stable investment, the investment rate in 
steady-state will remain close to the current levels, with the majority of Disney's Net 
PP&E being concentrated in this segment (around 75%). 
Furthermore, taking into account the competitors selected by us, we believe that a 
50/50 ratio between Disney’s regression beta and the average of the comparables 
is appropriate in order to obtain Ru (9,1%). 
In conclusion, given all the variables addressed in the study of this bunisess model, 
we believe that it will maintain a growth above the long-term nominal growth (3,6%, 
IMF data for developed economies), of 4.5% in the steady-state. 
Studio Entertainment 
Business Model 
Disney's Studio Entertainment segment is engaged in motion picture production 
Figure 15 - Evolution of revenues, exclusively from hotel 
stays, in billions of dollars.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 16 - Evolution of revenues, exclusively cruise 
passes, in billions of dollars.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
PE&P 2019FY 2025FY 2030FY 2035FY
Revenues 26 225 36 300 46 001 55 845
Gross Margin 47% 55% 57% 58%
Core Result 5 235 8 554 11 150 13 773
Net Margin 20% 24% 24% 25%
FCF 3 800 5 256 8 300 10 687
WACC 9% 11% 12% 13%
ROIC 18% 22% 21% 20%
Investment Rate 27% 39% 26% 22%
Growth 5% 8% 5% 4%
Table 1 - KPI's for PE&P segment.  
Source: Analyst Estimates 
and distribution under the Walt Disney Pictures, Twentieth Century Studios 
(previously Twentieth Century Fox, acquired in 2019 for $71,3bn), Marvel, 
Lucasfilm, Pixar, Searchlight Pictures (previously Fox Searchlight Pictures) and 
Blue Sky Studios banners. 
TWDC produces and distributes full-length live-action films and animated films 
(Figure 17). In the US theatrical market, it generally distributes and market the 
filmed products directly. In most major international markets, the distribution is 
direct while in other markets the films are distributed by independent companies or 
joint ventures. As a result of Covid-19, the distribution strategy may change and 
certain films intended for theatrical release may be licensed to DTCI for use on 
Disney+ in certain territories. Some of these films will be only released theatrically 
in certain territories where Disney+ is not available yet. 
Disney operates in the home entertainment market as well, distributing physical 
(DVD and Blu-ray) and electronic formats, usually three to six months after the 
theatrical release in each market. Physical formats are generally sold to retailers, 
such as Walmart and Target, and electronic formats are sold through e-tailers, such 
as Apple and Amazon.  
In the television market, Disney licenses the films to cable and broadcast networks, 
television stations and other video service providers, which may supply the content 
to viewers on television or a variety of internet-connected devices. 
This segment produces and licenses live entertainment events on Broadway and 
around the World. Lastly, the Disney Music Group commissions new music for the 
Company’s motion pictures and television programs. 
Revenue results derive mainly from licensing their motion pictures to theaters, sale 
of motion pictures in DVD, Blu-ray, and other electronic formats, TV/SVOD 
licensing fees, stage play ticket sales, and post-production services (Figure 18). 
Operating expenses consist primarily of amortization of production, participations, 
distribution costs and cost of sales. 
Market Overview and Competitors 
Since the dawn of filmmaking, that the American studios dominate the global film 
market. Being pioneers in this industry, these studios also benefited from the fact 
that they managed to perfect the art of large-scale distribution, as well as the 
production of high-quality films with great appeal to the public. 
The United States is the country with the highest box office revenue, with sales 
surpassing 11 billion dollars in 2019 (Figure 19), with the 25 to 39 age group making 
up the majority of the movie theater audience. In terms of the number of tickets 
sold, the US are ranked behind China and India. 
Today, the Big Five majors, Universal Pictures, Paramount Pictures, Warner Bros. 
Pictures, Walt Disney Pictures, and Columbia Pictures, consistently distribute 
hundreds of films every year into all significant international markets. It is nearly 
Figure 17 - Original poster of Disney first ever full-
length movie - Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs.  
Source: Wikipedia 
Figure 18 - Studio Entertainment 2019 Revenue 
Distribution.  
Source: TWDC Annual Report, 2019. 
Figure 19 - Leading box office markets worldwide in 2019, 
by revenue, in billions of dollars.  
Source: IHS Markit. 
impossible for a film to reach a broad international theatrical audience without being 
picked up by one of the Big Five for distribution (Bloomberg BI, 2019). 
Disney has a long history of making box office hits. Between 1995 and 2020, its 
movies have generated over $39 billion in box office sales, which is good enough 
for first place among all studios in that period, with a market share above 30%, 
Disney pulls in more than double the box office revenue generated by Warner Bros. 
and Universal (Figure 20) (Figure 21). 
Prior to Covid-19, the global film industry was presenting steady growth projections 
for the future (CAGR of 3%, 2014-2019) (Figure 22) with more than $42 billion in 
gross box office worldwide, in 2019. But without anyone foreseeing, we were taken 
by surprise by this pandemic that drastically impacted the film industry from its early 
stage, affecting ticket sales due to the fear of cinema lovers of attending crowded 
spaces and the closing of movie theaters due to governmental restrictions, with the 
aim of controlling the spread of the virus. In addition, box office revenue suffered 
as the number of movie releases diminished due to due to postponement or 
impossibility of production. The phenomenon can be observed in Figure 23, where 
the YoY revenue from this Disney’s segment declined 55% and 40% in the 3rd and 
4th quarter of 2020 fiscal year, respectively, being the second most affected 
business unit.  
When we look back at 2020, we will realize that this pandemic has changed the 
industry forever, which can be evidenced by the first ever mutual agreement to 
shorten theatrical exclusivity windows (covered in the next chapter), the beginning 
of experiments with in-home premium video-on-demand and increased creation of 
subscription video-on-demand platforms by the Big Five to launch movies that were 
otherwise supposed to head to theaters. In mid-2020, the Walt Disney had its first 
experiment with Mulan, as a premium buy on its fast-growing streaming service, 
Disney+, also the Pixar film Soul debuted on December 25. Furthermore, 
WarnerMedia (owner of Warner Bros.) also announced that Wonder Woman, a 
movie that might have made $1 billion at the box office in a normal summer will 
land in theaters and on HBO Max simultaneously (Coyle, 2020). What the future 
looks like for the cinema industry is more unclear than it is ever been in its history. 
Lastly, it is important to understand that in the traditional film distribution system, 
the usual split between a movie theater and studio is 50/50 of box office, but Disney 
already has negotiating clout with movie theaters because of its box office success, 
frequently negotiates a 60/40 deal, this ratio will be maintained or improved in 
Disney favor, due to movie theaters having a growing competition from video 
streaming services, and many consumers, nowadays, preferring to watch new 
movie releases at home, as shown in our questionnaire (Figure 24, being 5 very 
likely and 1 very unlikely). Mulan's release straight to Disney+ proves it can skip 
theaters completely, threatening to remove a lucrative revenue source for theatrical 
Figure 20 - Tickets sold for Disney movies 2006-2020, in 
billions.  
Source: The-numbers.com 
Figure 22 - Film industry revenue, by region, 2014-2019.  
Source: MPAA 
Figure 23 - Studio Entertainment revenues in millions and 
COVID cases. 
Figure 21 - Number of billion-dollar blockbusters by studio.  
Source: The-numbers.com 
distribution chains, such as AMC and Cinemark, increasing Studios’ profitability in 
the long-term. The ability to release a movie straight to its streaming platform will 
further enhance that negotiating power and it will also allow Disney the chance to 
get better terms in the future. 
The Big Five studios, can be found within a 24 km radius in Los Angeles, 
demonstrating the convergence of know-how and facilities that this industry has 
suffered, with Disney being the only one that continues to be part of the same 
conglomerate, The Walt Disney Company. The Big Five, as an oligopolistic 
collective, dominate 80-85% of US box office revenue (Figure 25). 
Universal Pictures is an American film studio owned by Comcast through its 
subsidiary NBCUniversal, and the oldest film studio in the United States. During 
this pandemic, Universal achieved an unprecedented deal with AMC and Cinemark 
(the largest and third-largest theatrical distribution chains, respectively) to shorten 
the traditional theatrical window (the industry average is about 90 days) to just 17 
days. After that time, Universal can release films, that do not reach certain box-
office thresholds, in its streaming platform, Peacock. Jurassic Park, Minions and 
Fast and Furious, were some of the films with the highest Box Office in the history 
of the studio. In 2019, Universal had a market share of 11,5% in the US.  
Paramount Pictures is an American film studio and subsidiary of ViacomCBS. 
Titanic, Indiana Jones, Transformers, Shrek and Mission Impossible, are the films 
produced by Paramount which generated higher revenues. As of 2019, Paramount 
had a market share of 5%.  
Warner Bros. Pictures is an American film production and distribution studio owned 
by the WarnerMedia Studios & Networks Group, which therefore is owned by 
AT&T. In December, Warner Bros., the world's second largest movie studio, 
announced that it will stream all of its 2021 films on HBO Max, simultaneously with 
movie theaters. Harry Potter, The Lord of the Rings, and the DC Comics films, 
represent some of the most relevant movies produced and distributed by 
WarnerMedia. Its 13,9% market share makes them the second biggest studio in 
the US.  
Columbia Pictures is an American film studio and production and distribution 
company that is a member of the Sony Pictures Motion Picture Group, itself a 
subsidiary of the Japanese multinational conglomerate Sony. Spider-Man, James 
Bond were just some of the films that had the most impact on the “big screen”, in 
terms of sales. Columbia ends our list of The Walt Disney Studios major 
competitors within the industry, with a market share of 12,1%.  
Each studio is approaching the current situation differently, either due to divergence 
at the corporate level or due to its position in the field of streaming platforms. For 
example, both Sony Pictures (Columbia Pictures) and Paramount do not yet have 
streaming services in their portfolio to be able to offload their films, having therefore 
Figure 25 - US film industry market share in 2019.  
Source: The-numbers.com 
Figure 24 - At the premiere of a film, would you choose to 
rent it at home, via a streaming service (for example, Disney 
+), instead of going to a movie theater?  
Source: Analayst Estimates, based on survey, 2020. 
postponed most of their productions or sold to intermediaries streaming services, 
such as Netflix or Amazon Prime Video. Lastly, all the Big Five Studios are part of 
some conglomerate, therefore the lack of specific information made us look into a 
smaller, but independent film production and film distribution, Lions Gate 
Entertainment Corporation, which is an American-Canadian entertainment 
company, that produced and distributed high box office films such as, The Hunger 
Games, The Twilight Saga and many others. Even though this company does not 
make part of a huge conglomerate as the other, it was still capable of reaching 5% 
of US Studio’s market share in 2019. 
Trends 
o The Fall of The Traditional Cinema Model and The 
Switch to Streaming Video-On-Demand 
Since the arrival of Covid-19, people all around the world have been forced to 
quarantine themselves at home in a dramatic fashion, unlike almost any other time 
in history. Moreover, workers have been equally impacted by virtue of state-
imposed shutdowns that have affected innumerable businesses, including the film 
industry. The results of this shutdown have produced a near total eradication of 
Hollywood’s traditional production and distribution models in place preceding the 
global pandemic. Although the streaming video on demand marketplace has 
existed for some time, only recently has it adopted inhouse production studios of 
its own. In the ensuing months during which Hollywood has been shut down, those 
streaming networks have seen a substantial increase in demand, and thus, 
financial profitability, which foreshadow other more ominous consequences for 
Hollywood’s traditional system of production and distribution to retail cinemas. 
Given that tickets sold fell 83% over this period and production was reduced in 
similar proportions, much of the industry’s workforce (900 thousand professionals) 
were rendered unemployed overnight. 
Given this, Cinemark theaters experienced a similar impact with a tremendous 
decrease in revenue in 2020, and AMC theatres are on the verge of declaring 
bankruptcy (Hollywood Survival Strategies in the Post-COVID 19 Era, 2020). 
According to several reports, only half of Americans say they would go to a movie 
during opening weekend during the first few months of 2021 with 65% either very 
unlikely or somewhat unlikely to return to a movie theatre within one month of 
reopening. Consumer anxiety about the safety of theatre attendance is also 
complicated by the competing but slowly increasing affinity for immediate 
accessibility to their film or TV series on streaming networks that some younger 
demographics of consumers have become accustomed to. 
The global pandemic has exacerbated the steady decline of consumers interested 
and committed to seeing films in movie theatres. After decades of slow but steady 
decline in attendance (CAGR of -1,3%, 2002-2019) (Figure 26), most think movie 
theaters will have to innovate in a way other than raising ticket prices. 
The switch to streaming from the traditional theatre distribution system includes a 
financial incentive for studios that can eliminate the 50% profit that typically accrues 
to box office and satellite airing rights, thereby creating a significant source of 
revenue that otherwise might be reinvested elsewhere in “original” streaming 
content. Third party distribution through theatres and satellite with single ticket 
sales have rarely been as profitable as the predictably reoccurring revenue that 
streaming services generate. Combined with the other factors involved in the 
production and distribution costs of the past, the switch to streaming makes 
financial sense provided that enough numbers of consumers are predisposed to 
make the switch permanently. 
The desires of contemporary audiences to consume their entertainment through 
smart-TV’s and other portable devices linked to broadband connections, paired 
with an aversion to Covid-19 exposure has culminated in a dramatic change of fate 
for the Hollywood entertainment industry across television and film products. And 
that change would have happened anyway, were it not for an already pre-existing 
phenomena like the fact that “The viewing habits of the post-television generation 
vary from platform to platform as different screens are used for different styles of 
viewing” and that “88% of Netflix users and 70% of Hulu+ users watch 3 or more 
episodes of the same television show in a day and 7 out of 10 American television 
viewers describe themselves as binge viewers” (Strangelove 2015, 127). 
While digital society are undoubtedly being fed a diet of on-demand content ready 
for their consumption, the conditions of our current quarantined state will not last 
forever, and even once Covid-19 disappears, behavioral psychologists believe that 
abandoning such easily obtained satisfaction is unlikely, and so far as these 
corporations, which dominate Hollywood, are concerned, they stand ready and 
willing to supply as much as one can consume for as long as there’s a desire and 
money to pay for their fee. 
Finally, and as our questionnaire shows, from a sample of 557 people from all over 
the world, only 27% of them admitted that, from now on, it would be "very unlikely" 
or "unlikely" to see a film debut through a platform of streaming, which also confirms 
this change in consumer preferences and the metamorphosis of the traditional 
cinema distribution system. 
o The Obsolescence of Physical Formats of Distribution  
Predicting the future of media is always complicated, but as of 2020, the streaming 
revolution is starting to pick up steam, and right now, it seems that streaming 
services are becoming the preferred way to watch film and television within the 
home. Physical media’s prevalence seems to become less and less an option as 
time goes on. With DVD sales declining and consumers willingly selling their 
Figure 26 - US Annual tickets sold, 2002-2020.  
Source: The-numbers.com 
libraries off to video rental stores, it doesn’t look too positive for the home library 
(Figure 27). The owners of the services are now choosing when you can and can’t 
have access to things. We already see this happening with Disney when they 
acquired Fox’s library. 
Additionally, the Motion Picture Association of America in its annual Theatrical 
Home Entertainment Market Environment report, described the sharp drop in sales 
of physical content distribution formats. According to IHS Markit data, global sales 
of video disc formats (meaning DVD, Blu-ray, and UltraHD Blu-ray) were $25 billion 
in 2014 but only $13 billion in 2018 (Figure 28). That's almost a 50% drop in four 
years. 
The arrival of streaming is starting to create a tremendous shift in the home library 
of Americans and also the worldwide population. The slow transition away from 
DVD and Blu-ray is shown in our forecast as we believe that this segment will 
become obsolete in the long-term. 
Drivers 
The trends discussed above are extremely relevant to understand how studio 
entertainment revenues were forecasted. Given this expected change in the way 
the films will be distributed and consumed by the mass audience in the future and 
taking into account the appearance of Disney+, we divided revenue sources into 2 
categories, theater related revenues and Disney+ films related revenue. 
The first assumption to understand is the decline in the number of people who 
choose to go to the cinema to see a film premiere instead of seeing it at home 
(Figure 29) through the acquisition of the film on the Disney+ platform (in 2020, 
Mulan was the pilot test of this new way to consume Disney films, costing $30). In 
2019, on average each Disney film was seen by 65 million people, so for projected 
number of Disney’s movie viewers we applied the growth rate of the population 
aged in their 30’s (from the regions that we find most relevant). After getting this 
number, we divided into the people who prefer to watch the films in the cinemas 
and people who choose to see at home. We believe that in 2021, 83% will continue 
to prefer going to the cinema, but we will see a gradual decrease as streaming 
platforms gain more and more ground. We expect that in 2035, we will see only 
30% of people watching movies in theaters. 
In conclusion, considering that the number of films released will be close to the 
historical average (around 11 relevant films released each year) (Figure 30), the 
number of subscribers of the platform, the distribution between home-viewers and 
theater-viewers, and that an average family that subscribes Disney+ has 3 
members, we apply these rates and values thus obtaining the revenues of 
“theatrical distribution licensing”. 
Margins, Rates and Assets & Liabilities 
Figure 27 - Disk sales and rentals revenue in the United 
States from 1st quarter 2014 to 1st quarter 2020.  
Source: Nielsen. 
Figure 28 - Global sales of physical content distribution 
format, 2014-2018.  
Source: MPAA. 
2021F 2025F 2030F 2035F
% of movie theaters viewers 83% 65% 40% 30%
% of Disney + film viewers 17% 35% 60% 70%
Figure 29 - Distribution between people who watch film on 
Disney+ and on the theaters.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 30 - Number of blockbusters released by Disney 
each year, 2014-2020.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
In Studio Entertainment, the change in the traditional model of film distribution will 
favor Disney, which in this way manages to cut costs and optimize its streaming 
platform. Therefore, as we see this phenomenon unfold, and more and more 
people are joining this new way of watching movies, we will also see the segment's 
ROIC increase considerably (Figure 31), and the investment rate of this sector will 
not change significantly. 
The most relevant assets for this business model are the theatrical film cost 
advances and goodwill (the latter being a non-cash movement, so we have chosen 
to keep it constant). 
Regarding the discount rate of this segment and given that there are no relevant 
public competitors, we decided to give a weighting of 25/75 between the average 
of the comparables and Disney’s regression beta, resulting in a Ru of 8,2%. 
Lastly, and considering all drivers, trends, rates and other variables, we believe 
that a 3,9% growth in steady state, fits in with the long-term prospects of nominal 
growth for developed economies. 
Macro Overview 
2020 was undoubtedly a very atypical year, with Covid-19 entering our lives and 
affecting in a way or another the way we work, how we entertain ourselves, how 
we socialize, our life in general. But other macroeconomic events must be 
addressed as they play a crucial role in assessing companies’ valuation and their 
future as a company facing this panorama. 
Covid-19 epidemic began in January 2020 in what is believed to be in the Wuhan 
province of China. By March epidemiologists at the WHO later characterized Covid-
19 as a pandemic. As a result of this pandemic, many countries and regions had 
to impose quarantines, entry bans, or other restrictions for citizens, prevent their 
own citizens from travelling overseas to control the spread of the virus in the most 
affected areas. Together with a decreased willingness to travel, the restrictions 
have had a negative economic and social impact on the travelling and hospitality 
sectors of those regions. 
At the time of this research submission over 1,5 million people have died and over 
72 million cases have been confirmed worldwide (Figure 32) (Figure 33). 
Given this, the adverse impact of Covid-19 on TWDC businesses will continue for 
an unknown length of time and may continue to impact certain key sources of 
revenue, as the company has business interests in areas that involve mass 
gatherings including its theme parks and film releases. Nonetheless, other areas 
including its streaming service and the television brands might benefit from the 
social isolation. Theme parks were closed or operating at significantly reduced 
capacity for a significant portion of the year (Table 2), cruise ship sailings, guided 
tours and stage play performances were suspended since late in the second 
Studio Entertainment 2020FY 2025FY 2030FY 2035FY
Revenues 9 636 15 061 18 040 20 913
Gross Margin 52% 64% 67% 69%
Core Result 1 774 3 926 5 483 7 155
Net Margin 18% 26% 30% 34%
FCF 1 547 2 691 3 846 5 036
WACC 7% 8% 8% 9%
ROIC 6% 10% 12% 13%
Investment Rate 13% 31% 30% 30%
Growth 1% 3% 4% 4%
Figure 31 - KPIs for Studio Entertainment segment.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 32 - Mapa Mundi of the most and least affected 
countries by Covid-19.  
Source: World Meters info, 2020. 
Figure 33 - Number of cumulative cases of Covid-19 
worldwide since January 8th.  
Source: World Meters info, 2020. 
Walt Disney World Resort 15/03 - 10/07
Disneyland Resort 14/03 - ….
Disneyland Paris 14/03 - 14/07 and 30/10 - ….
Hong Kong Disneyland Resort 26/01 - 17/06 and 15/07 - 24/09 
Shangai Disney Resort 25/01 - 10/05
Tokyo Disney Resort 29/02 - 30/06
Disney Cruise Line 14/03 - ….
Table 2 - PE&P's operations closing period due to covid-19.  
Source TWDC annual report, 2020. 
quarter, and retail stores were closed for a significant portion of the year. In 
addition, Disney has delayed or, in some instances shortened or cancelled, 
theatrical releases and have experienced adverse impacts on advertising sales and 
on our merchandise licensing business. (Disney Annual Report, 2020) 
Recent news on the efficacy of Covid-19 vaccines has indeed come as welcome 
news, but we know that a vast distribution program remains several months away. 
Scientists and health experts indicate that vaccines will be available to the majority 
of the population, in developed countries, around the second quarter of 2021. So 
we believe that 2021, despite being a much more positive year for Disney, than the 
previous one, we will only see park attendance values return to normal in mid-2022, 
by which time we believe most of the population will feel safe, health wise, both for 
traveling and attending mass gathering locations, as shown in our valuation. 
In November, Joe Biden defeated the incumbent president Donald Trump in the 
2020 presidential election and will be inaugurated as the 46th president on January 
2021, and will likely have to work with a Republican Senate majority, limiting his 
ability to implement the Democratic fiscal agenda. Nevertheless, Biden pledged to 
raise the corporate tax rate to 28% from 21% (Figure 34), which was incorporated 
in our valuation for future years. 
Given the current panorama, global economy is expected to slow -3,8% (YoY%) in 
2020, with sectors such as airlines, restaurants and movie theaters being most 
affected by this pandemic. While sectors related to Internet, TV, and Mail-Order 
Retailers were the top performers. The regions where Disney operates with greater 
preponderance are North America (representing 80% of revenue), Europe (11%) 
and Asia Pacific (9%). The three regions had and will have impacts of different 
scale on their economies. The least affected, Asia Pacific, as it was the first to be 
affected by the pandemic, managed to contain the number of cases better and 
presents more optimistic values for the GDP growth. On the other hand, North 
America and Europe, which are currently experiencing a 2nd wave of Covid cases, 
had started to take containment measures later so their economies suffered the 
most. (Figure 35). 
Capital Structure 
Given the peer companies that we have selected for TWDC, we can observe that 
Disney’s 0,24 D/E, in Market Values, is one of the lowest among its comparables. 
As we have decided to value Disney as a sum of parts, we can notice that Media 
Networks (median D/E of 0,46) (Figure 36), Parks, Experiences and Products 
(median of 1,33) (Figure 37) and Studio Entertainment (median of 0,75) (Figure 38) 
are the segments that have higher capital needs, while DTCI has a very low debt 
profile (median of 0,14).  As Disney will become more oriented towards its DTCI 
business we are expecting the debt levels to decrease in the long-term. 
Figure 34 - Evolution of US corporate tax rate, since 1980.  
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and 
Product Accounts data, 2020. 
Figure 35 - Real GDP growth (YoY%), by region.  
Source: Bloomberg Estimates. 
Figure 36 - Comparison of the D/E of Media Network peer 
companies.  
Source: Bloomberg data. 
While Disney has a strong liquidity position (Table 3), their goal is to return to levels 
consistent with a single A credit rating, as stated by Bob Iger in the 4Q 2020 
earnings webcast. As part of that commitment and given limited visibility due to 
Covid-19 and decision to prioritize investment in DTC initiatives, the board has 
decided to forego payment of a semi-annual dividend in January 2021. Capital 
allocation strategy will continue to prioritize investing in the growth of the four 
businesses, particularly in the direct-to-consumer segment. However, we anticipate 
the payment of a dividend will remain a part of the long-term capital allocation 
strategy following the return to a normalized operating environment. We believe 
that in the long-term the distribution of dividends (payout ratio) will go in line with 
their historical average of 25,7%, as shown in our valuation. 
In November 2020, Disney credit rating was downgraded to BBB+ (S&P). Even 
though it maintains a solid liquidity position, the S&P credit rating company have 
downgraded Disney during the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2019, interest coverage was 
very solid as well rounding 13x, meaning that Disney EBIT is almost 13 times higher 
than their interest expense responsibilities. Due to Covid-19, in 2020, this ratio was 
close to 0x, but in 2021 we will see this ratio returning to pre-Covid values. 
Relative Valuation 
To perform a relative valuation, several companies, that operate in the same 
industries as Disney, were selected. We believe that only few companies are 
relatively close to Disney’s business operations as a whole, those being Comcast 
and Viacom, as these have segments in Media Networks, Parks (Viacom does not), 
Studio and Streaming. Therefore, we decided to choose some companies that 
operate in those segments alone. This approach is not very precise, as Disney 
benefits from the dynamics between the different segments, and the fact that it is 
a conglomerate comes with a better risk diversification, as the success or failure of 
one segment will affect the others. 
We think that these multiples valuation does not in any way reflect the way a 
company like Disney should be evaluated, since it operates in industries that have 
little or nothing to do with each other and because it is in a phase of extreme 
change, with the appearance of their streaming platform. Given these facts, we 
undoubtably think that the best way to do a valuation of TDWC is through a DCF 
of the Sum of Parts. 
Moreover, the current panorama, with Covid-19, metrics like P/E, EV/NOPLAT or 
EV/EBITDA are distorted, due to the negative results that mature companies 
operating in the hospitality and entertainment industries are presenting, which 
makes it impossible to execute these same metrics. Despite this, we decided to 
use two forward metrics that takes into account the future results of the selected 
peers (based on the consensus of several researchers, taken from Bloomberg) and 
Figure 37 - Comparison of the D/E of PE&P peer 
companies.  
Source: Bloomberg data. 
Figure 38 - Comparison of the D/E of Studio Entertainment 
and DTCI peer companies.  
Source: Bloomberg data. 
Solvency Ratios 2017FY 2018FY 2019FY 2020FY
Quick Ratio 74% 86% 84% 126%
Current Ratio 81% 94% 90% 132%
Cash Ratio 21% 23% 17% 67%
Table 4 - Segment's EV/EBITDA FY2 multiples.  
Source: Bloomberg Estimates. 
Table 3 - Disney's solvency ratios evolution.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
EV/EBITDA FY2 Multiples
Media Networks 8,3
Parks, Experiences and Produtcs 23,7
Studio Entertainment 15,7
Direct to consumer and International 30,0
Disney itself (based on our projections), EV/EBITDA FY2 and P/E FY2. This way 
we obtain normalized results and thus surpass the Covid-19 obstacle.  
Through the EV/EBITDA FY2 (Table 4), when we apply the 2-year forward multiple 
to the respective EBITDA from each segment we get a Price per Share of $171,36 
in 30th of September (end of Disney’s 2021 Fiscal Year, our targeted valuation 
date). Lastly, in order to execute the P/E FY2 approach (Table 5), we take into 
account the multiples from our peers and apply it to the respective EPS of each 
Disney’s segment, resulting in a Price per Share of $198,10. 
Valuation 
Looking at the company as a whole (Table 6), we can observe that ROIC grows at 
a steady pace (reaching 18% in steady state), which is mainly supported by DTCI 
and its growing platform, Disney+, and Studio Entertainment that will favor with the 
new dynamics of market that are affecting the film industry. 
Regarding NOPLAT, despite the negative effect of Media Networks, it will increase 
at a CAGR of 9%, being the biggest contributor to this growth, DTCI with the 
expected large-scale adhesion by the public and the steady growth (as seen in the 
previous years) of Parks, Experiences and Products, that will continue to provide 
value for its shareholders (Figure 39). 
We forecast an average investment rate of 37% in the 2021-2025 period, reaching 
20% in the long term. Thus, resulting in a long-term nominal growth rate (3,5%) for 
Disney that is in line with the growth of developed economies. 
Even though Disney is trading close to our target price, we believe that the market 
is not considering the benefits of Disney as a whole and the fact that the success 
of one segment will mean the success of another. Therefore, our model 
contemplates the deterioration of MN in the long run, however our expectations for 
DTCI becoming the forefront of Disney's revenues counterbalance the 
disappearance of the MN segment, and although PE&P is currently facing great 
adversities, in the long run it will maintain its cash-cow status. The new model for 
distributing films, despite still a bit unclear and in an embryonic stage, has 
enormous potential for companies like Disney. And therefore, based on our 
Adjusted Present Value Valuation, we reached a Market Cap of $ 369,34 billions, 
resulting in a price per share of $ 204,05 (Table 7). 
The closing stock price for Disney (DIS) was $ 181,18 as of January 4th 2021, 
indicating it is trading at discount of 9,3%. Thus, our final recommendation to 





Table 5 - Segment's P/E FY2 multiples.  
Source: Bloomberg Estimates. 
PE&P 2020FY 2025FY 2030FY 2035FY
Revenues 71 498 117 142 151 868 183 878
Gross Margin 32% 47% 52% 55%
Core Result 5 618 23 027 35 491 46 825
Net Margin 8% 20% 23% 25%
FCF 13 179 15 384 27 149 37 499
ROIC 4% 13% 16% 18%
Investment Rate -135% 33% 24% 20%
Growth -5% 4% 4% 4%
Table 6 - KPIs for TDWC.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 39 - TWDC Revenue distribution in 2019 Vs 2035.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
P/E FY2 Multiples
Media Networks 10,3
Parks, Experiences and Produtcs 48,8
Studio Entertainment 28,3
Direct to consumer and International 50,2
Market Capitalization 369 337$        
Target Price 204,05$          
Price 04/01/2021 181,18$          
Expected Return 9,3%
Recommendation Hold
Table 7 - Disney Final Valuation.   
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Bibliography 
▪ n.d. All Time Worldwide Box Office for Lionsgate Movies. https://www.the-numbers.com/box-office-
records/worldwide/all-movies/theatrical-distributors/lionsgate. 
▪ n.d. All Time Worldwide Box Office for New Line Movies. https://m.the-numbers.com/box-office-
records/worldwide/all-movies/theatrical-distributors/new-line. 
▪ n.d. All Time Worldwide Box Office for Paramount Pictures Movies. https://www.the-
numbers.com/box-office-records/worldwide/all-movies/theatrical-distributors/paramount-pictures. 
▪ n.d. All Time Worldwide Box Office for Sony Pictures Movies. https://www.the-numbers.com/box-
office-records/worldwide/all-movies/theatrical-distributors/sony-pictures. 
▪ n.d. All Time Worldwide Box Office for Universal Movies. https://www.the-numbers.com/box-office-
records/worldwide/all-movies/theatrical-distributors/universal. 
▪ n.d. All Time Worldwide Box Office for Warner Bros. Movies. https://www.the-numbers.com/box-office-
records/worldwide/all-movies/theatrical-distributors/warner-bros. 
▪ Bachman, Daniel. 2020. "United States Economic Forecast." Deloitte Insights. 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/us-economic-forecast/united-states-outlook-
analysis.html. 
▪ n.d. Box Office History for Walt Disney. https://www.the-numbers.com/market/distributor/Walt-Disney. 
▪ Business Strategy Hub. 2020. Top 19 Disney Competitors. July. https://bstrategyhub.com/top-disney-
competitors/. 
▪ n.d. China Inflation Forecast 2019-2060, Data and Charts. https://knoema.com/yrbmclg/china-
inflation-forecast-2019-2024-and-up-to-2060-data-and-charts?action=export&gadget=a0f6d7b9-
2b3f-d39f-862a-0579588a3084. 
▪ n.d. "Cruise line." Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cruise_line. 
▪ Disney Cruise Line Blog. 2020. Fleet Sailing Schedule. https://disneycruiselineblog.com/cruise-
planning/itineraries/fleet-sailing-schedule/. 
▪ n.d. France Inflation Forecast 2019-2060, Data and Charts. https://knoema.com/pznbvwc/france-
inflation-forecast-2019-2024-and-up-to-2060-data-and-charts. 
▪ 2020. "Hollywood Survival Strategies in the Post-COVID 19 Era." 14. 
▪ Hungerford, Thomas L. 2019. Corporate tax rates and economic growth since 1947. 
https://www.epi.org/publication/ib364-corporate-tax-rates-and-economic-growth/. 
▪ n.d. Inflation rate. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/WEOWORLD. 
▪ ING. 2020. Global Macro Outlook. ING. 
▪ Investopedia. 2020. News. https://www.investopedia.com/how-disney-makes-money-4799164. 
▪ —. 2019. Top Stocks. July. https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/052115/who-are-disneys-dis-
main-competitors.asp. 
▪ n.d. Japan Inflation Forecast 2019-2060, Data and Charts. https://knoema.com/chjehcb/japan-
inflation-forecast-2019-2024-and-up-to-2060-data-and-charts. 
▪ Kumar, Danny Haydon Neeraj. 2020. "Industries Most and Least Impacted by COVID-19 from a 
Probability of Default Perspective – September 2020 Update." S&P Global Market Intelligence. 
September. https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/blog/industries-most-and-
least-impacted-by-covid19-from-a-probability-of-default-perspective-september-2020-update. 
▪ n.d. List of amusement park rankings. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_amusement_park_rankings. 
▪ n.d. List of Walt Disney Studios films (2010–2019). 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Walt_Disney_Studios_films_(2010%E2%80%932019). 
▪ Lock, S. 2020. Attendance at amusement and theme parks worldwide by facility in 2019. July. 
https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/194247/worldwide-attendance-at-
theme-and-amusement-parks/. 
▪ —. 2020. Attendance at the Disneyland theme park (Anaheim, California) from 2009 to 2019 (in 
millions)*. July. https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/236154/attendance-at-
the-disneyland-theme-park-california/. 
▪ —. 2020. Attendance at the Disney's California Adventure theme park from 2009 to 2019 (in millions)*. 
July. https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/236181/attendance-at-the-
disneys-california-adventure-theme-park/. 
▪ —. 2020. Attendance at the Disney's California Adventure theme park from 2009 to 2019 (in millions)*. 
July. https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/236181/attendance-at-the-
disneys-california-adventure-theme-park/. 
▪ —. 2020. Attendance at the Disney's Hollywood Studios theme park (Walt Disney World Florida) from 
2009 to 2019 (in millions)*. July. 
▪ —. 2020. Attendance at the Epcot theme park (Walt Disney World Florida) from 2009 to 2019 (in 
millions)*. July. https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/236164/attendance-at-
the-walt-disney-world-epcot-theme-park/. 
▪ —. 2019. Sales revenue of selected leading hotel companies worldwide in 2019. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/273064/revenue-of-the-largest-hotel-groups-worldwide/. 
▪ —. 2020. Walt Disney World Animal Kingdom theme park attendance 2009-2019. July. https://www-
statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/236167/attendance-at-the-walt-disney-world-
animal-kingdom-theme-park/. 
▪ —. 2020. Walt Disney World Magic Kingdom theme park attendance 2009-2019. July. https://www-
statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/232966/attendance-at-the-walt-disney-world-magic-
kingdom-theme-park/. 
▪ n.d. Major film studios. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_film_studios#Instant_major_studios. 
▪ Management, J.P. Morgan Asset. 2020. "Economic and Market Update." 
https://am.jpmorgan.com/blob-gim/1383409519194/83456/MI-
EAMU_2Q20.pdf?segment=AMERICAS_US_ADV&locale=en_US. 
▪ Manghnani, Mohit. 2020. More Trouble For Movie Theaters As Disney Postpones 'Free Guy,' 'Death 
On The Nile'. November. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/more-trouble-movie-theaters-disney-
064355487.html. 
▪ MPA. 2019. "Theme Report 2019." 
▪ National Association of Theatre Owners. 2020. "Film Industry - statistics & facts." 
▪ Oriental Land Company. 2020. Change in 1-day passport ticket prices at Tokyo Disneyland and 
DisneySea theme parks in Japan from fiscal year 2010 to 2019. April. https://www-statista-
com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/1117266/tokyo-disneyland-disneysea-theme-park-change-
ticket-prices/. 
▪ —. 2020. Food and beverage net sales per guest at Tokyo Disneyland and DisneySea theme parks in 
Japan from fiscal year 2012 to 2019. April. https://www-statista-
com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/996881/net-sales-per-guest-tokyo-disneyland-disneysea-
theme-park-food-beverage/. 
▪ —. 2020. Merchandise net sales per guest at Tokyo Disneyland and DisneySea theme parks in Japan 
from fiscal year 2012 to 2019. April. https://www-statista-
com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/996941/net-sales-per-guest-tokyo-disneyland-disneysea-
theme-park-merchandise/. 
▪ —. 2020. Tokyo Disneyland and DisneySea theme park attendance Japan FY 2010-2019. July. 
https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/996751/japan-combined-attendance-
tokyo-disneyland-disneysea-theme-park/. 
▪ n.d. Salary for Industry: Movie Studio. 
https://www.payscale.com/research/US/Industry=Movie_Studio/Salary. 
▪ Samso, R. 2019. Attendance at Disneyland Paris theme parks in France from 2009 to 2018. May. 
https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/639475/disneyland-paris-theme-park-
visitor-numbers/. 
▪ —. 2019. Attendance at the Walt Disney Studios Park theme park (Disneyland Paris) from 2010 to 
2018 (in millions)*. May. https://www-statista-
com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/236191/attendance-at-the-disneyland-paris-walt-disney-
studios-park-theme-park/. 
▪ Statista. 2020. "Walt Disney Company." 
▪ Tatevosian, Parkev. 2020 . Could Disney Be a Millionaire-Maker Stock? November. 
https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/11/09/could-disney-be-a-millionaire-maker-stock/. 
▪ Themed Entertainment Association. 2020. Attendance at Disney theme park locations in 2019, by 
park. July. https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/227490/disney-world-
visitors-orlando-usa/. 
▪ —. 2020. Attendance at the Hong Kong Disneyland theme park from 2009 to 2019 (in millions)*. July. 
https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/236183/attendance-at-the-hong-kong-
disneyland-theme-park/. 
▪ —. 2020. Attendance at the Shanghai Disneyland theme park in China from 2016 to 2019. July. 
https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/876125/china-shanghai-disneyland-
attendance/. 
▪ UN DESA. 2020. World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision. July. https://www-statista-
com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/1106711/population-of-europe/. 
▪ VanDerWeff, Emily. n.d. "Here’s what Disney owns after the massive Disney/Fox merger." Vox. 
https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/3/20/18273477/disney-fox-merger-deal-details-marvel-x-men. 





          MASTER IN FINANCE 
 
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR ACADEMIC PURPOSES BY BERNARDO PATRÍCIO AND DINIS MARTINS MASTERS IN 
FINANCE STUDENTS OF THE NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS. THE REPORT WAS SUPERVISED BY A NOVA SBE FACULTY 
MEMBER, ACTING IN A MERE ACADEMIC CAPACITY, WHO REVIEWED THE VALUATION METHODOLOGY AND THE FINANCIAL MODEL.  
 (PLEASE REFER TO THE DISCLOSURES AND DISCLAIMERS AT END OF THE DOCUMENT) 
  




▪ Media Networks has been the biggest cash cow segment 
of Disney for the past years, however the paradigm is changing 
due to the cord-cutting trend, which has decreased cable 
subscribers. 
▪ In the PE&P segment will be impacted by the 
implementation of the new dynamic and heavy price model, and as 
soon as the population begins to be vaccinated for Covid-19, on a 
large scale, we will see this segment returning to its cash cow 
status. 
▪ With the introduction of the new cinematographic content 
distribution model, Studio Entertainment segment will see major 
improvements in terms of ROIC and Margins, as more and more 
people will watch films on the streaming platform (Disney+). 
▪ DTCI is Disney’s segment that most increased in the past 
years 2 years (5x). Disney+ exceeded all expectations reaching 72 
M users worldwide in the first year. With Hulu in 2021 expanding to 
other geographies, our projections for all DTC solutions make this 
segment the most valuable Disney asset in 2035. 
▪ Based on the APV valuation, The Walt Disney Company 
price target for 2021FY is $204,05. As of the 4th of January of 
2021, the closing price was $181,18, meaning it is trading at a 
discount of 9,3%. Our final recommendation is to HOLD.  
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The Walt Disney Company is a Media and Entertainment company 
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Theme Parks & Experiences, Theatrical Content and Streaming 
Services. 
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The Walt Disney Company has built a diverse empire since its beginning in the 
1920s, creating a considerable range of lucrative products in a number of 
marketplaces. As the largest mass media conglomerate in the world, Disney is 
best known for its film and TV productions, theme parks and the recent addition 
of Disney+ and Hulu to their portfolio. Together with its subsidiaries, Disney is a 
diversified worldwide entertainment company with operations in four business 
segments: Media Networks; Parks, Experiences and Products (PE&P); Studio 




This segment operates mainly in two areas, Domestic Cable Networks and 
Broadcasting. The first manages cable channel brands such as Disney (Figure 1), 
ESPN (Figure 2), Freeform, FX and National Geographic (Figure 3). Each of 
these brands (except for Freeform) operate several channels that target different 
age groups or different sport preferences (ESPN). Regarding the Broadcasting 
operation, TWDC1 includes a domestic broadcasting network and eight domestic 
television stations. The company owns ABC Television Network which reaches, in 
partnership with the affiliate stations (approximately 240), the whole (The Walt 
Disney Company 2019) US television households, which currently are 120,6 
million (Statista, 2019). In aggregate the local television stations owned by 
Disney, reach 20% (TWDC, 2019) of the US TV households. Both in DCN2 and 
the Broadcasting operation, there is television production, distribution operations 
and acquisition of programming rights. The in-house content creation besides 
being used in the Media Networks and DTCI3 segments are also in some 
situations licensed to third parties. Regarding the business model, revenues from 
this segment are mostly derived from Affiliate fees, Advertising and TV/SVOD4 
distribution (Figure 4). Affiliate fees are charged to MVPDs5, digital OTT6 services 
and television stations affiliated with ABC Network. These fees are defined in 
multi-year licensing agreements with the counter parties that define a fee per 
subscriber. The Advertising revenue comes from the sale of advertising time on 
the domestic network and on the cable channels. The only advertising revenue 
 
1 The Walt Disney Company 
2 Domestic Cable Networks 
3 Direct-to-Consumer & International 
4 Subscription Video on Demand 
5 Multichannel Video Programming Distributor  
6 Over-the-top 
Figure 3 - US Subscribers to Freeform, Fx and National 
Geographic channels, in millions. 
Source: TWDC 2020 Annual Report 
Figure 4 - 2020 Media Networks Revenue, in millions. 
Source: TWDC 2020 Annual Report 
Figure 5 - Revenue from the top 7 companies in the 
Media Networks industry, in millions. 
Source: Bloomberg, November 2020 
Figure 1 - US Subscribers to Disney Channel channels 
in 2020, in millions. 
Source: TWDC 2020 Annual Report  
Figure 2 - US Subscribers to ESPN channels in 2020, in 
millions. 
Source: TWDC 2020 Annual Report 
 
 








that is reported in Media Networks is the one that is ratings-based, the non-ratings 
based type of advertising is reported in DTCI. This revenue is affected by the 
number of viewers and the rating of each show, which are measured by Nielson. 
Finally, revenue from TV/SVOD, originates from the sale of the rights to use 
television programs and from content transactions within the Company. 
Regarding the main expenses, the operating expenses are the most predominant 
and they are mainly programming and production costs. 
Market Overview and Competitors 
The US Media Networks segment is populated in material terms by 7 firms. The 
2019 revenue of these firms was $418 bn and the evolution is presented in Figure 
5. The revenue presented in the exhibit represents all operations, not only 
regarding the Media Networks segment. This allows us to understand that the 
companies that operate in this segment are large conglomerates that benefit from 
synergies with other business segments. We can see in Figure 6 the percentage 
of each company’s revenues that are represented by their US Media Networks 
operation. Figure 7, represents the evolution of TWDC’s MN segment revenue. 
Average Revenue of the 7 companies and average EBITDA Margin is presented 
in Table 17. The lower result in EBITDA margin, presented by TWDC is due to 
being active in the Cable and Broadcasting environment, the latter having worst 
margin results in comparison. Regarding, ROIC and WACC, we are comparing 
MN results with the whole of the comparable company’s average industry results 
and we can see that MN WACC is above the average and the value added is 
smaller than in the overall Media and Entertainment industry. The targeted 
population that these companies aim is the US households with TV access which 
according to Nielson in 2020 is 120,6 million. The major broadcasting channels, 
ABC, NBC, CBS and FOX reach almost all this population according to the 
respective annual reports. The cable channels reach is not the whole US 
households with tv, and it depends widely on the type of channel. 
As this Disney segment operates several channels with different content, from 
sport to news, all other channels prove themselves as a competitor in terms of 
splitting viewership. Channels compete for viewers and subscriptions, if a Disney 
competitor increases its market share, Disney’s branded channels viewership 
decreases. Thus, this advertising revenue decreases proportionally (TV-
Broadcasting Competition and Advertising, Didier Laussel et al) due to the 
viewership being directly tied to the ratings-based advertising (Figure 8). The 
affiliate fees will also likely decrease as MVPDs offer a lower per subscriber value.  
Regarding the Broadcasting competitive environment, Disney’s ABC rivals with 
Comcast’s NBC, Viacom’s CBS, FOX and CW Network (joint-venture between 
 
7 The * means that not all the 7 comparables had available information. Discovery INC, AMC Networks and AT&T were excluded. 
Figure 6 - Percentage of Media Networks revenue from 
total company revenue. 
Source: Excel model calculations on each company’s 
annual report 
Figure 7 - Evolution of Media Networks industry 
Revenue, in millions.  
Source: Bloomberg, 2020 
Table 1 - Revenue, EBITDA margin, ROIC and WACC 
from MN industry and TDWC'S MN segment.  
Source: Excel model calculations 
Average KPI All MN Comparables TWDC MN
Revenue from MN 15 952 24 827
EBITDA Margin 34% 28%
EBITDA Margin, Excluding 
only Cable Providers
27% N/A
Overall Company's ROIC* 8,91% 8,77%
Overall Company's WACC 5,53% 8,64%
Figure 8 - Top rated regular TV shows in the US 2019. 
The Nielson Rating is from left to right.  
Source: Nielson, 2020 
Figure 9 - Revenue from Broadcasting and Cable 
Networks from the companies with the highest revenue 
in Media, in millions. 
Source: Each company’s 2019 annual report 
Figure 10 - Leading Ad Supported Broadcast and cable 
networks in the United States in 2019, by average 
number of viewers, in millions. 












ViacomCBS and AT&T). Apart from CW, all these channels reach approximately 
the whole US TV households, the only difference being the reach of the local 
branded broadcasting channels, where Disney’s 20% reach is below the 
competitors. When analysing the total broadcasting environment, the values in 
Figure 9 go in hand with the viewership results (Figure 11), as Viacom’s CBS was 
the most watched channel in 2019, followed by Comcast’s NBC and Disney’s 
ABC. FOX closely follows ABC and the CW Network is clearly less important than 
the other 5 broadcasting networks.  
One of the biggest competitors for Disney is Comcast, which owns several 
channels presented in Figure 11. When comparing total US households’ 
subscriptions between TDWC and CMCSA, the number is quite similar, although 
the latter has more channels. 
Viacom CBS also operates cable channels, such as: Showtime, Nickelodeon, 
Comedy Central, MTV and others. We can see in Figure 128, the number of 
American households who have access to them. 
AT&T owns the brand Turner which itself owns CNN, TBS, TNT, Cartoon Network 
(Figure 13) and others, AT&T also owns Home Box Office (HBO). Although CNN 
is a pay cable channel it competes with the traditional broadcasters, and reaches 
96,2 million households (according to CNN). Regarding the cable channels AT&T 
does not have the highest number of subscribers or viewers (Nielson, 2019), 
however the fact that it owns several channels means cable revenues are the 
highest throughout all competitors. The fact that the AT&T group includes 
telecommunication offerings, which risk wise resemble a utility, the model doesn’t 
use AT&T’s beta as a comparable to the MN segment. 
Fox Corporation is an enterprise that resulted from a spinoff of Twentieth Century 
Fox. In the cable channels FOX News reached 84 million households (FOX 
Corporation Annual Report, 2019) and FOX Sports is a strong competitor for 
ESPN as we can see in Figure 14.  
Disney also faces competition from Discovery Inc, which owns several channels 
such as Discovery Channel, TLC, HGTV, Animal Planet, Food Network and 
others. We can see figures from some of Discovery’s cable channels in Figure 15. 
They are quite similar with competitors as certain genres of cable channels are 
usually part of the same packages offered by MVPDs. 
There are also smaller competitors such as AMC (Figure 16), Sinclair 
Broadcasting Group, Tegna or Sony (international cable channels) which are 
some sort of competitors, however due to size, overall operations or materiality 
are not included in the comparable group for valuation purposes. 
 
8 Due to lack of information data is for 2018 instead of 2019. 
Figure 11 - Comcast cable channel subscribers in 2019, 
in millions. 
Source: Comcast’s annual report, 2019 
Figure 12 - ViacomCBS cable channel subscribers in 
2018, in millions. 
Source: Nielson, 2018 
Figure 13 - AT&T cable channel subscribers in 2019, in 
millions.  
Source: AT&T annual report, 2019. 
Figure 14 - US Sports Channels, in millions.  
Source: Nielson, 2018 
Figure 15 - Discovery Corporation channel subscribers 
in 2019, in millions. 
Source: Discovery Inc annual report, 2019 
Figure 16 - AMC channel subscribers in 2019, in 
millions.  
Source: AMC annual report, 2019 
 
 








Regarding the overall revenues between segments of each of the competitors, 
Disney was the second strongest in 2019 in the cable networks segment (Figure 
9). When adding the total revenues (only including the major competitors 
discussed above and not including Tegna and Sinclair Broadcasting Group), 
Disney has the most percentage of total revenues closely followed by Comcast, 
AT&T and Viacom (Figure 17). When we compare EBITDA margins, we can see 
that the values are quite similar with the exception for the companies that only 
operate in the cable channels segment, which provide a higher EBITDA margin in 
comparison with broadcasting networks (Figure 18). 
A final note on the way the competition affects Disney’s future performance, the 
segment has reached a steady state in the past years, with similar Gross and Net 
Margins and also a small revenue growth (2019 and 2020 are exceptions due to 
the consolidation of TFCF channels). The way the competition operates is equal to 
TWDC with Affiliate Fees and rating based advertising, and there is nothing to 
believe market share will change between these companies. The changes in the 
future of this segment, which are further explained in the drivers’ part of the report 
are solely explained by the deterioration of the overall MN market in the US. 
Valuation 
 The revenue forecast for Media Networks and DTCI are dependent due to the 
Cannibalization effect, representative of the increase subscription numbers of DTC 
solutions in comparison with traditional Media Networks. This effect is tied to the 
cord cutting phenomena. However, DTC is expected to achieve an organic growth 
beyond the users that are transferring from Media Networks such as the users that 
are gaining access to online video content. KPI’s are presented in Table 2. 
Trends 
o Cord-Cutting 
This phenomenon started around 2007 and it consists of traditional pay tv 
channels, losing subscribers, Figure 19. (Cordcutting, 2020). Cord cutting started 
around the same time Netflix launched its SVOD service. The lower cost offering 
combined with the financial crisis started the seed for a movement that over the 
years has led to 31,2 million cord-cutters in the US alone (financial reasons are 
the most crucial in the decision to cord cut, Figure 20. According to TechCrunch, 
cord cutters will reach 46,6 million US households in 2024 which would mean 
there would be only 62 million cable US TV households that year (due to slower 
decrease in subscribers in 2020, when comparing with CordCutters data, the 
model does not assume that drastic decrease, it assumes that there will be 70 
million US TV households in 2024 in the drastic scenario). TWDC has been 
suffering this cable subscribers decline in the past years in its own channels and 
 
Figure 17 - Market share of revenue in the US Media 
Networks segment, in 2019. 
Source: Each company's 2019, annual report. 
Figure 18 - EBITDA margin, 2019.  
Source: Analyst estimates 
Figure 19 - DirecTv, Dish, Charter and AT&T aggregate 
subscribers.  
Source: Analyst computations on Leichtman reseach 
group data, 2019. 
Figure 20 - Reasons for cancelling cable subscriptions. 
Source: Limelight Network 
MN 2020FY 2025FY 2030FY 2035FY
Revenues 28 393 22 746 19 873 17 656
Gross Margin 39% 40% 40% 40%
Core Result 5 981 4 662 4 047 3 554
Net Margin 21% 20% 20% 20%
FCF 8 785 5 090 4 224 3 718
WACC 9% 10% 11% 12%
ROIC 10,66% 8,72% 7,77% 6,93%
Investment Rate -46,86% -9,18% -4,38% -4,60%
Growth -5,00% -0,80% -0,34% -0,32%
Table 2 - KPI's for MN segment.  
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
 
 








on equity investments channels such as A&E and History, Figure 21. This effect 
has also been noted in the number of primetime viewers in the leading cable 
channels, Figure 22. In 2020, due to Covid-19 and its effects in the cancelling of 
live sports and the financial impact, cord-cutting has been the highest ever with a 
7,5% drop in cord subscribers (eMarketer), which was double of what was 
expected. Logically, this cord cutting effect will punish cable providers and 
therefore will also decrease affiliate revenues for cable operators. eMarketer 
expects that cord cutting will affect ad revenue for cable channel operators, the 
decrease in ad spending is expected to decrease from $70,59bn in 2019 to $67,48 
bn in 2024. From Zenith (Figure 23), we can observe that North America and the 
Asia Pacific region have been decreasing in the past years the expenditure on tv 
advertising, however in Europe it is still growing, this tendency is expected to 
invert as streaming platforms become more common in Europe. The fact that all 
major Media Network companies have launched or will launch (Discovery Inc) a 
streaming platform with their content, is the proof that the traditional pay-tv model 
is dying, and that companies are adapting. According to our survey, 45% of 
respondents would cancel cable for only streaming platforms which goes in line 
with the overall market feeling. This tendency is reflected on the model with the 
decrease in Media Networks subscribers and International cable subscribers. In 
order to reflect the uncertainty regarding the pace of this trend, in the model, the 
decrease in subscribers takes in consideration 3 possible rhythms of cord cutting. 
o Cannibalistic Tendency 
The definition commonly used is when a company “eats” into its own market by 
introducing a new product to an existing line or an established brand. (Tammy 
Drezner, Cannibalization in a Competitive Environment). The SVOD and vMVPD 
solutions created by traditional Media Network companies such as TWDC, 
Comcast, Viacom and AT&T enter this definition (The Motley Fool, 2019). The 
investment in streaming solutions is to capture clients that are fleeing from 
traditional pay-tv, so, the only way this change is beneficial for the companies 
above mentioned is if margins or pricing are better in the Direct-to-Consumer 
environment than in the traditional Media Networks (US and International). 
Currently, the margins in the DTC scenario, taking Netflix as the best proxy, are 
far from the levels that TWDC’S MN cash cow segment has reached. The 
company’s MN segment EBITDA margin in 2019 was 27,5% in comparison with 
Netlflix’s 12%. However, MN has a stable EBITDA margin in the past years due to 
being a consolidated segment, and Netflix has been improving for the past years 
(averaging 4% annual growth) its EBITDA margin. On a steady state, DTC 
solutions are expected to increase the EBITDA margins, with the consolidation of 
the market. However, against contrary belief, the margins are not bound to heavily 
Figure 21 - Evolution of TWDC's cable subscribers, in 
millions.  
Source: TWDC Annual Reports 
Figure 22 - Leading cable networks in the United States 
from by number of primetime viewers.  
Source: Nielson, 2019 
Figure 23 - TV advertising spending worldwide from 
2000-2022, by region. Also shown, the yearly US 
variation.  
Source: Zenith, 2019 
 
 








overcome the steady-state MN margins, as competition for consumers and 
content is much larger. For non-traditional Media Network brands such as 
Amazon, Apple or Netflix this effect isn’t presented as they do not own cable or 
broadcasting operations that can suffer from cannibalism. In the survey we 
realized, the respondents were divided if they were cancelling all their cable 
subscriptions for Pay-tv (Figure 24). If we only took USA residents responses the 
Yes answer was 82%, which hints that the cord cutting movement is more 
advanced in the USA. The model represents this trend as the subscribers lost by 
traditional pay-tv channels are absorbed by the expected counter-parties in the 
streaming solutions and the margins for DTCI evolve during the years to the 
steady state which is slightly higher than the MN steady state. 
Revenue Drivers  
With the concepts approached above, in the trends, we can formulate some 
visions regarding the future Revenues for Media Networks and DTCI. Due to the 
uncertainty on the pace that people will adopt DTC solutions and cancel cable 
subscriptions, the model contemplates a risk factor where we assume there is a 
65% probability of a drastic change from MN to DTC, 25% modest change and 
10% slight change (Table 3).  The percentages reflect our view, in relation to the 
past cord cutting events and future expectations on the total number of cable 
subscribers. Regarding Media Networks revenue, sources are separated in 4 
captions. Other, represents the sale of National Geographic Magazines, which is 
becoming a legacy business (Figure 25). Due to the legacy status, no change in 
the number of subscribers is expected and the cost of the subscription will vary 
with expected US inflation. Regarding the TV/SVOD licensing, the company has 
stated that it intends to stop licensing content to other companies as it wishes to 
maintain full control with its platforms in particular Disney’s DTC solutions, this 
change will have different paces in accordance with the future state, for example, 
if the drastic change to DTC scenario is the future, a higher decrease in TV/SVOD 
licensing revenue is expected. The forecasted revenues are presented in Figure 
26. 
Regarding the most important captions for MN revenues, the value drivers are the 
number of subscribers, the average advertising fee per subscriber and the 
average affiliate fee negotiated per subscriber. Each channel negotiates a different 
affiliate fee per subscriber with MVPD’s, the most expensive channel MVPD’s pay 
Disney for is ESPN, reports say in 2017 it was paying $9 per subscriber and that 
value only increased from then onwards (Mywallst, 2020). ESPN is the largest 
sports channel in the US reaching in 2019 a daily average of 700 thousand 
viewers (Deadline, 2019). For model purposes we combined the affiliate fees and 
multiplied by the number of subscribers to reach the affiliate revenue. For the past 
Disney ESPN Freeform FX NG
Drastic Change to DTCI -3,76% -3,76% -3,76% -3,76% -3,76%
Modest Change to DTCI -2,60% -1,52% -1,88% -2,60% -2,60%
Slight Change to DTCI -1,00% -1,00% -1,00% -1,00% -1,00%
ABC National ABC Local TV/SVOD Distrubuting Licensing Advertising Affiliate Fees
Drastic Change to DTCI -1,50% 20,00% -25,00% -1,00% -1,00%
Modest Change to DTCI -0,50% 20,00% -15,00% -0,50% -0,50%
Slight Change to DTCI -0,20% 20,00% -5,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Table 3 - Model estimates for each scenario.  
Source: Analyst estimates 
Figure 25 - Media Networks, revenue overview, in 
millions.  
Source: TWDC Annual report 
Figure 26 - MN forecasted revenues, in millions of USD. 
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Figure 24 - Would you cancel cable or satellite services 
and opt only for streaming?  
Source: Analyst estimates, based on survey, 2020. 
 
 








years, affiliate revenues in Media Networks have kept climbing although the 
subscriber count has been decreasing, this has happened because the affiliate 
fees are negotiated periodically, and the revision of fees that goes in line with the 
decrease in subscribers has not happened yet. This trend will soon end, as 
MVPD’s will not be able to pay as much carriage fees on a declining business. For 
that reason, the model contemplates a decrease in per subscriber value. In 
relation to the subscriber count, the expected decrease varies with the expected 
change to DTC for the cable channel viewers. In Figure 27, we can compare 2019 
average affiliate fee’s per subscriber. TWDC has the highest average affiliate fee’s 
by almost twice of the average, due to ESPN (AT&T data includes international 
channels and therefore is excluded from the average). The model assumes this 
value will decrease, as the whole industry does. In the most drastic change, an 
expected decrease of subscribers is consistent with a 5-year average of the 
variation of the US population with cable. In the modest scenario the decrease is 
expected to be the average of Disney’s past 4 years decrease of each cable 
channel and for the slight change, it is assumed a small decrease of a single 
percentage point (Table 3). The average advertising per cable subscriber is also 
presented in Figure 26. This value, due to the cord-cutting effect, according to 
eMarketer is expected to decrease over the years, and the model contemplates it. 
The value presented in Figure 27 for TWDC differs from the ones presented in the 
model, due to simplification purposes the model aggregates branded channels.  
For the broadcasting number of subscribers, the driver is the US population with 
TV access which is measured as a penetration rate of the whole population. 
Depending on the expected rate of change to DTC this penetration is expected to 
decrease. For the past 4 years, the number of TV households increased from 118 
million to 121 million, it has been increasing in opposition to the cord cutting 
phenomena in the cable channels. For this reason, the decrease in Broadcasting 
Affiliate Fees and Advertising is slower than the cable counterpart, however we 
expect it to decrease, as users are starting to view these channels through on 
demand methodologies. 
Covid-19 isn’t affecting Media Networks revenue as, through an analysis on the 
quarterly earnings and number of Covid-19 cases in the US, doesn’t demonstrate 
a negative correlation Figure 28. 
Margins, Rates and Assets & Liabilities 
Margins in the Media Networks segment are quite consistent with the rest of the 
industry (Table 4) and have been quite consistent over the past, therefore the 
margins aren’t expected to change in the future and the model assumed that 
reasoning. There is not an expectation of improving operating margins as the 
market is already mature and investment is being targeted to DTCI. (Figure 29). 
Average KPI All MN Comparables TWDC MN
Revenue from MN 15 952 24 827
EBITDA Margin 34% 28%
EBITDA Margin, Excluding 
only Cable Providers
27% N/A
Overall Company's ROIC* 8,91% 8,77%
Overall Company's WACC 5,53% 8,64%
Figure 27 - 2019 Average per cable subscriber fee. 
Source: Analyst estimates 
Figure 28 - MN revenues in millions and COVID cases. 
Source: Analyst estimates 
Table 4 - KPI's on MN and industry data.  
Source: Analyst estimates 
Figure 29 - MN margins.  
Source: Analyst estimates 
 
 








Regarding the return on assets that this segment has, the model assumes it is 
represented 50% by Disney’s regression beta and 50% the average of the 
comparables that can be a proxy for the Media Networks beta, which are 
Comcast, ViacomCBS, Fox Corp and Discovery Inc. Although AT&T and AMC are 
discussed in the report for segment information, due to the small size of AMC and 
the internet providing business of AT&T, their beta does not reflect this market 
Table 6. The current WACC (2020) for TWDC’S MN is 8,64% and the ROIC 
8,77% which signifies that no value is being added, and the segment is stagnated, 
in the steady state the WACC is expected to increase to 13,01% (the model 
assumes all segments have the same capital structure) and the ROIC is expected 
to decrease to 7,2%, which goes in line with our expectation of the MN destroying 
value. This result is consistent with our nominal g in the steady state being -0,3%, 
which means this segment will eventually seize to exist. This assumption is based 
on the continuous decrease of subscribers and on the demographic change that 
will happen (the oldest generation is the one that is maintaining their cable 
subscriptions). 
When discussing assets in the Media Networks and DTCI segments we are mainly 
discussing Television Costs Rights, Advances and Intangibles (Figure 30). For the 
Media Network segment, a regression between revenues and these rights was 
tested, Table 5, and applied to the model (the higher interval of the 95% 
confidence interval was used, as to ensure a steady decrease of content). 
Regarding the intangible assets, they currently contain mostly MVPD agreements 
(that will decrease due to cord-cutting), character/franchise intangibles, copyrights 
and trademarks. As the segment is expected to decline no variation of intangible 
assets is recorded. When discussing the forecasting of NWC as a whole, both 
assets and liabilities which mainly depend on the revenues caption, are 
decreasing, thus the long-term cash-flow from NWC in Media Networks is quite 
small (Figure 31). 
Parks Experiences and Products 
Business Model  
Under this business segment, TWDC operates six theme parks, recording 156 
million ticket sales in 2019 around the world (Figure 32) (Figure 33), which include 
The Walt Disney World Resort in Florida, Disneyland Resort in California, 
Disneyland Paris, as well as ownership interest in resorts in Hong Kong (48%) and 
Shanghai (43%). 
Additionally, it operates Tokyo Disney Resort through an intellectual property 











F stat 11,73 3,00
ssreg 219306215,67 56090802,22
Table 6 - MN and comparables Ru.  
Source: Bloomberg, 2020 
Figure 30 - MN television costs rights and advances. 
Source: Analyst estimates 
Table 5 - Regression data on television costs rights and 
advances relation with revenues. 
Source: Analyst estimates 
Figure 31 - NWC for MN segment.  
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Figure 32 - 2019 attendance of each Disney Park, in 
millions.  
Source: AECOM; Themed Entertainment Association. 
 
 








experiences, including 15 resorts, expeditions and adventures, all part of Disney 
Vacation Club. 
Moreover, Disney has a four-ship vacation cruise line, the Disney Magic, Disney 
Wonder, Disney Dream and the Disney Fantasy, which operates out of ports in 
North America and Europe. The ships cater to families, children, teenagers and 
adults, with distinctly themed areas and activities for each group. Many cruise 
vacations include a visit to Disney’s Castaway Cay, a 405-ha private Bahamian 
island. The Company is expanding its cruise business by adding three new ships. 
The first ship, the Disney Wish, is scheduled to launch in the summer of 2022 with 
the other two ships to be delivered from the shipyard in 2024 and 2025. These 
dates include impacts from shipyard delays due to Covid-19.  
Consumer Products also represent a substantial share in this segment, which 
includes licensing of merchandise, such as toys, games, home décor, 
accessories, books and consumer electronics. Some of the major properties 
licensed by the Company include: Mickey and Minnie, Frozen, Star Wars, Disney 
Princess and Avengers. TWDC also sells Disney, Marvel, Pixar and Lucasfilm 
branded products through retail stores and internet sites globally. 
Regarding this business unit, revenue comes mainly from selling theme park 
admissions, food, beverages, and resort vacation stays (Figure 34). Merchandise 
licensing and sales through their theme parks, cruises, resorts, retail stores and 
online stores also represents a significant income in this segment. Disney also 
manages real estate, such as the ESPN Wide World of Sports Complex (in 
Florida’s park) which in 2020 hosted the remainder of the NBA season. Operating 
expenses consists primarily of operating labor (70% of their workforce is 
concentrated in this segment) (Figure 35), costs of goods sold, infrastructure 
costs, supplies, commissions, entertainment offerings and depreciation. It is also 
important to notice that, over 70% of the Company’s capital spent has been in this 
segment, which is mostly for theme park and resort expansion, new attractions, 
cruise ships, capital improvements and systems infrastructure. 
Theme parks traditionally have served as the reliable cash cow for TWDC. When 
the studios or cable networks faltered, the theme parks have been there to keep 
the company in the black. However, with the pandemic closing parks and largely 
keeping fans away from ones that have reopened, we are now observing other 
segments supporting the company. 
Market Overview and Competitors 
The theme park industry started in the US in 1955, and Disney was the first 
company to take a step in this direction (Figure 36). This sector (quite capital-
intensive) has evolved considerably in the last decades, and today it is an industry 
of billions of dollars and that attracts people worldwide. 
Figure 33 - Change in Disney’s Parks annual 
attendance, in millions. 
Source: AECOM; Themed Entertainment Association 
Figure 34 - Parks, Experiences and Products 2019 
Revenue Distribution. 
Source: TWDC Annual Report, 2019. 
Figure 35 - Disney’s employees distributed by segment.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
 
 








The industry is matured in developed economies, being dominated by a small 
group of companies with marketing expertise and with the necessary capital to 
renew and constantly improve their attractions/facilities, thus constituting an entry 
barrier for new players in the market. Regardless of location, the degree of 
ultimate success will always have as much to do with intangible elements, quality 
of design, efficiency of service and public fancy, as with anything else (Vogel, 
2011). 
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, it is believed that theme parks' short-term plan will 
not be to maximize the number of visits to their parks, due to the restrictions 
imposed by governments, in addition to the increased fear of public that frequents 
these spaces of large agglomerations. At the same time, we will see a new ticket 
price model being implemented (Figure 37), a dynamic model that will take into 
account the day of the week, for example, and which will vary according to the 
number of attractions that the customer wishes to attend. This will allow customers 
to be reorganized and "spread" more efficiently, avoiding large concentrations of 
visitors during high season, giving those who can afford a better experience, while 
improving margins. 
Therefore, big players are betting on attractions where the public will be more 
connected and more involved in the experience that is going to a theme park, thus 
creating in them the desire to pay more, for something that creates a more 
immersive and exclusive experience. Disney has become a pioneer in dynamic 
ticket pricing, with the theme park industry largely beginning to follow in its 
footsteps. 
Furthermore, around 15% of this segment’s revenue comes from their hotel and 
resort stays (Figure 38). In 2019, this industry has presented a revenue of $220 bn 
in the US alone, with an average daily rate of $131 and an occupancy rate of 67% 
(below Disney’s rate of 87% in the same period) (Figure 39). Furthermore, in 
recent years, more and more people across the globe have begun to see travel as 
an integral part of life. Leisure travel spending has seen year-over-year growth 
over the past five years (CAGR of 4,6%). The hotel industry's market size has also 
benefited from this influx of travelers seeing consistent YoY growth of 4,3%. 
Disney is also present in the cruise industry, which represents around 8% of 
segment’s revenue. This market has generated an estimated revenue of $45 bn in 
2018, worldwide, a value which has grown by $15 bn over the last half decade 
(CAGR of 5% during this period). The industry made significant recovery after 
revenue fell below $25 bn during the 2009 global recession (Figure 40). 
While the theme park, hotel and cruise industries have shown growth over the last 
decade, 2020 was a terrible year for companies operating in these markets. This 
was a direct result of the coronavirus pandemic, with the implementation of travel 
restrictions to curb the spread of the disease, international and domestic tourism 
Figure 36 - Original Disney tickets from 1955.  
Source: Insider.com 
Figure 37 - Disney average ticket price, in dollars.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 38 - Hotels and Cruises contribution to 
segment's revenue.  
Source: TWDC annual report, 2020. 
Figure 39 - Hotel Occupancy rates by geographical 
region.  
Source: Global Hotel Review, Page 2. 
 
 








came to a halt (Figure 41). Due to the consequences of this pandemic, this sector 
saw its revenues decrease by 86% and 61%, in 2nd and 3rd quarter of the previous 
fiscal year (Figure 42), contributing to a negative FCF (which will be addressed in 
the final chapter of this segment’s analysis). 
Major competitors to TWDC can be found in industries like entertainment and 
leisure, such as theme parks, resorts and cruise lines businesses. 
Regarding the theme parks, Walt Disney Attractions are by far the most visited 
amusement facilities in the World, with a 30% market share in 2019 (Figure 43), 
followed by privately-owned companies, such as, OTC Parks, Fantawild Group 
and Chimelong Group all three of them being Chinese Amusement Parks, Merlin 
Entertainment in the UK and Parque Reunidos in Spain. This leaves us with four 
public US companies, Universal Parks & Resorts, Six Flags, Cedar Entertainment 
and SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment. The latter will be given a more detailed 
analysis as we have more information to scrutinize.  
Universal parks & resorts is best known for attractions and lands based on famous 
classic and modern pop culture properties from not only NBCUniversal (owned by 
Comcast), but also third-party companies, for all of its parks. In August 2020, a 
report released by Deutsche Bank revealed that the Universal Orlando theme park 
had surpassed Disney World Resort in total attendance, amid coronavirus. 
(Bloomberg, 2020) 
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation owns and operates regional theme and 
waterparks. The company's parks offer various thrill rides, water attractions, 
themed areas, concerts and shows, restaurants, game venues, and retail outlets. 
Cedar Fair, together with its subsidiaries, owns twelve theme parks, four outdoor 
water parks, one indoor water park and five hotels in the United States and 
Canada.  
SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment owns and operates twelve recreational 
destinations in the United States, including seven theme parks and five water 
parks. 
We have also found interesting and relevant to compare this business segment of 
Disney to the biggest (in terms of Market Cap., Revenues and guests/passengers) 
publicly owned companies in the hospitality and cruise line industries.  
Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. is a multinational hospitality company, that 
manages and franchises a broad portfolio of hotels and resorts. As of June 2020, 
its portfolio includes around six thousand properties with one million rooms in 
more than one hundred countries.  
Carnival Corporation & Plc is a cruise line company that provides vacations to 
various destinations, operating several hotels and lodges as well. 
Figure 41 - Hotel and Cruise occupancy rates and parks 
attendance, 2017-2020. 
Source: TWDC annual report, 2020. 
Figure 42 - PE&P revenues in millions and COVID cases.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 43 - Top 10 of the most visited theme parks in 2019.  
Source: Statista through Theme / Museum Index 2019. 
Figure 40 - Number of cruise ship passengers 2009-2020.  
Source: Statista through Cruise Industry Outlook 2020. 
 
 








Finally, we must not disregard local competition from other corporations, for 
example, smaller hotels, oceanariums, resorts, basically companies operating in 
the hospitality sector, leisure activities and vacation related activities. 
Drivers 
In order to obtain the most realistic and complete forecast possible, theme park 
admissions, and resort and vacation revenue, the two main sources of revenue in 
this segment, had to be dissected as much as possible. 
Theme park admissions was calculated through the individual analysis of each 
one of the six parks that Disney owns (considering that Disney only owns 48% of 
Hong Kong’s park, 43% of Shanghai’s park and receives royalties from the 
Japanese park). Firstly, we need to look at previous attendance levels and growth 
for each park. In 2020, we observed an attendance decrease of 49% in each park, 
on average, so from 2021 to 2022 we are taking into account that we will observe 
a process of gradual normalization in relation to the number of visits, which we 
believe it will only return to the pre-Covid levels by the end of 2022 (Figure 44) and 
from that moment we apply the growth rate of the population of around 30 years of 
age in each of the respective (parks) geographic areas, as we believe it is the 
driver that better reflects the typical ticket buyer. We were able to get the average 
ticket price by dividing the Theme Park admissions by total attendance, and for 
forecasted years the expected inflation for each geography was applied (in more 
recent years, due to the change in their price strategy, from the current model to 
the more price heavy/dynamic model they plan on implementing, ticket prices will 
increase above inflation) (Figure 45). 
Regarding Tokyo’s park, the process was different, as we had to take into 
consideration that under the licensing agreement that Disney reached with OLC 
group in 1979, OLC agreed to pay 10% of its admission revenues and 5% of its 
food and souvenir revenues as royalty to Disney. 
Regarding the second biggest stream of revenue in this segment, resorts and 
vacations, the sales from resort stays and cruise passes must be forecasted. In 
respect to resorts and hotels revenue, in the annual report we have the 
information regarding “Occupancy Rate”, “Available Room Nights” and “Per Room 
Guest Spending”, so this process of forecasting was fairly simple, as we applied 
the inflation rate to the average spending. Lastly, we presented the same 
assumption that we will not see the same level of attendance pre-Covid before 
2023, assuming a gradual increase during that time (Figure 46). For the cruise line 
forecast, the method was similar, as it depends on the capacity of each ship, the 
occupancy rate and the average price per night. Currently, Disney owns four 
cruise ships (Dream, Magic, Wonder and Fantasy ships), and three ships will join 
the fleet in 2022, 2024, and 2025. It should be noted that the occupancy rate of 
Figure 44 - Projected Parks' total admissions.  
Source: Analyst Estimates 
Figure 45 - Evolution of revenues, exclusively from parks 
admissions, in billions of dollars.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 46 - Evolution of revenues, exclusively from hotel 
stays, in billions of dollars.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 47 - Evolution of revenues, exclusively cruise 
passes, in billions of dollars.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
 
 








Disney cruises has exceeded 100%, through a more efficient management 
strategy to support greater demand in the summer and winter vacation months 
(which is common in this industry) (Figure 47). 
Margins, Rates and Assets & Liabilities 
In terms of margins, this segment will not see drastic changes, and as mentioned 
earlier, having reached maturity, profitability levels will converge to the pre-Covid 
years. Still, it should be noted that the fact that Disney is betting on the 
implementation of the new pricing model will cause ROIC to see slight 
improvements (from 18% in 2019 to 22% in 2025) (Table 7), values far above the 
respective WACC, thus maintaining its cash-cow status that creates value both in 
the short and long term. 
As a sector that needs constant and stable investment, the investment rate in 
steady-state will remain close to the current levels, with the majority of Disney's 
Net PP&E being concentrated in this segment (around 75%). 
Furthermore, taking into account the competitors selected by us, we believe that a 
50/50 ratio between Disney’s regression beta and the average of the comparables 
is appropriate in order to obtain Ru (9,1%). 
In conclusion, given all the variables addressed in the study of this bunisess 
model, we believe that it will maintain a growth above the long-term nominal 
growth (3,6%, IMF data for developed economies), of 4,5% in the steady-state. 
Studio Entertainment 
Business Model 
Disney's Studio Entertainment segment is engaged in motion picture production 
and distribution under the Walt Disney Pictures, Twentieth Century Studios 
(previously Twentieth Century Fox, acquired in 2019 for $71,3bn), Marvel, 
Lucasfilm, Pixar, Searchlight Pictures (previously Fox Searchlight Pictures) and 
Blue Sky Studios banners. 
TWDC produces and distributes full-length live-action films and animated films 
(Figure 48). In the US theatrical market, it generally distributes and market the 
filmed products directly. In most major international markets, the distribution is 
direct while in other markets the films are distributed by independent companies or 
joint ventures. As a result of Covid-19, the distribution strategy may change and 
certain films intended for theatrical release may be licensed to DTCI for use on 
Disney+ in certain territories. Some of these films will be only released theatrically 
in certain territories where Disney+ is not available yet. 
Disney operates in the home entertainment market as well, distributing physical 
(DVD and Blu-ray) and electronic formats, usually three to six months after the 
PE&P 2019FY 2025FY 2030FY 2035FY
Revenues 26 225 36 300 46 001 55 845
Gross Margin 47% 55% 57% 58%
Core Result 5 235 8 554 11 150 13 773
Net Margin 20% 24% 24% 25%
FCF 3 800 5 256 8 300 10 687
WACC 9% 11% 12% 13%
ROIC 18% 22% 21% 20%
Investment Rate 27% 39% 26% 22%
Growth 5% 8% 5% 4%
Table 7 - KPI's for PE&P segment.  
Source: Analyst Estimates 
Figure 48 - Original poster of Disney first ever full-












theatrical release in each market. Physical formats are generally sold to retailers, 
such as Walmart and Target, and electronic formats are sold through e-tailers, 
such as Apple and Amazon.  
In the television market, Disney licenses the films to cable and broadcast 
networks, television stations and other video service providers, which may supply 
the content to viewers on television or a variety of internet-connected devices. 
This segment produces and licenses live entertainment events on Broadway and 
around the World. Lastly, the Disney Music Group commissions new music for the 
Company’s motion pictures and television programs. 
Revenue results derive mainly from licensing their motion pictures to theaters, sale 
of motion pictures in DVD, Blu-ray, and other electronic formats, TV/SVOD 
licensing fees, stage play ticket sales, and post-production services (Figure 49). 
Operating expenses consist primarily of amortization of production, participations, 
distribution costs and cost of sales. 
Market Overview and Competitors 
Since the dawn of filmmaking, that the American studios dominate the global film 
market. Being pioneers in this industry, these studios also benefited from the fact 
that they managed to perfect the art of large-scale distribution, as well as the 
production of high-quality films with great appeal to the public. 
The United States is the country with the highest box office revenue, with sales 
surpassing 11 billion dollars in 2019 (Figure 50), with the 25 to 39 age group 
making up the majority of the movie theater audience. In terms of the number of 
tickets sold, the US are ranked behind China and India. 
Today, the Big Five majors, Universal Pictures, Paramount Pictures, Warner Bros. 
Pictures, Walt Disney Pictures, and Columbia Pictures, consistently distribute 
hundreds of films every year into all significant international markets. It is nearly 
impossible for a film to reach a broad international theatrical audience without 
being picked up by one of the Big Five for distribution (Bloomberg BI, 2019). 
Disney has a long history of making box office hits. Between 1995 and 2020, its 
movies have generated over $39 billion in box office sales, which is good enough 
for first place among all studios in that period, with a market share above 30%, 
Disney pulls in more than double the box office revenue generated by Warner 
Bros. and Universal (Figure 51) (Figure 52). 
Prior to Covid-19, the global film industry was presenting steady growth 
projections for the future (CAGR of 3%, 2014-2019) (Figure 53) with more than 
$42 billion in gross box office worldwide, in 2019. But without anyone foreseeing, 
we were taken by surprise by this pandemic that drastically impacted the film 
industry from its early stage, affecting ticket sales due to the fear of cinema lovers 
of attending crowded spaces and the closing of movie theaters due to 
Figure 51 - Tickets sold for Disney movies 2006-2020, in 
billions.  
Source: The-numbers.com 
Figure 49 - Studio Entertainment 2019 Revenue 
Distribution.  
Source: TWDC Annual Report, 2019. 
Figure 50 - Leading box office markets worldwide in 2019, 
by revenue, in billions of dollars.  
Source: IHS Markit. 












governmental restrictions, with the aim of controlling the spread of the virus. In 
addition, box office revenue suffered as the number of movie releases diminished 
due to due to postponement or impossibility of production. The phenomenon can 
be observed in Figure 54, where the YoY revenue from this Disney’s segment 
declined 55% and 40% in the 3rd and 4th quarter of 2020 fiscal year, respectively, 
being the second most affected business unit.  
When we look back at 2020, we will realize that this pandemic has changed the 
industry forever, which can be evidenced by the first ever mutual agreement to 
shorten theatrical exclusivity windows (covered in the next chapter), the beginning 
of experiments with in-home premium video-on-demand and increased creation of 
subscription video-on-demand platforms by the Big Five to launch movies that 
were otherwise supposed to head to theaters. In mid-2020, the Walt Disney had 
its first experiment with Mulan, as a premium buy on its fast-growing streaming 
service, Disney+, also the Pixar film Soul debuted on December 25. Furthermore, 
WarnerMedia (owner of Warner Bros.) also announced that Wonder Woman, a 
movie that might have made $1 billion at the box office in a normal summer will 
land in theaters and on HBO Max simultaneously (Coyle, 2020). What the future 
looks like for the cinema industry is more unclear than it is ever been in its history. 
Lastly, it is important to understand that in the traditional film distribution system, 
the usual split between a movie theater and studio is 50/50 of box office, but 
Disney already has negotiating clout with movie theaters because of its box office 
success, frequently negotiates a 60/40 deal, this ratio will be maintained or 
improved in Disney favor, due to movie theaters having a growing competition 
from video streaming services, and many consumers, nowadays, preferring to 
watch new movie releases at home, as shown in our questionnaire (Figure 55, 
being 5 very likely and 1 very unlikely). Mulan's release straight to Disney+ proves 
it can skip theaters completely, threatening to remove a lucrative revenue source 
for theatrical distribution chains, such as AMC and Cinemark, increasing Studios’ 
profitability in the long-term. The ability to release a movie straight to its streaming 
platform will further enhance that negotiating power and it will also allow Disney 
the chance to get better terms in the future. 
The Big Five studios, can be found within a 24 km radius in Los Angeles, 
demonstrating the convergence of know-how and facilities that this industry has 
suffered, with Disney being the only one that continues to be part of the same 
conglomerate, The Walt Disney Company. The Big Five, as an oligopolistic 
collective, dominate 80-85% of US box office revenue (Figure 56). 
Universal Pictures is an American film studio owned by Comcast through its 
subsidiary NBCUniversal, and the oldest film studio in the United States. During 
this pandemic, Universal achieved an unprecedented deal with AMC and 
Cinemark (the largest and third-largest theatrical distribution chains, respectively) 
Figure 56 - US film industry market share in 2019.  
Source: The-numbers.com 
Figure 53 - Film industry revenue, by region, 2014-2019.  
Source: MPAA 
Figure 54 - Studio Entertainment revenues in millions and 
COVID cases. 
Figure 55 - At the premiere of a film, would you choose to 
rent it at home, via a streaming service (for example, Disney 
+), instead of going to a movie theater?  
Source: Analayst Estimates, based on survey, 2020. 
 
 








to shorten the traditional theatrical window (the industry average is about 90 days) 
to just 17 days. After that time, Universal can release films, that do not reach 
certain box-office thresholds, in its streaming platform, Peacock. Jurassic Park, 
Minions and Fast and Furious, were some of the films with the highest Box Office 
in the history of the studio. In 2019, Universal had a market share of 11,5% in the 
US.  
Paramount Pictures is an American film studio and subsidiary of ViacomCBS. 
Titanic, Indiana Jones, Transformers, Shrek and Mission Impossible, are the films 
produced by Paramount which generated higher revenues. As of 2019, Paramount 
had a market share of 5%.  
Warner Bros. Pictures is an American film production and distribution studio 
owned by the WarnerMedia Studios & Networks Group, which therefore is owned 
by AT&T. In December, Warner Bros., the world's second largest movie studio, 
announced that it will stream all of its 2021 films on HBO Max, simultaneously with 
movie theaters. Harry Potter, The Lord of the Rings, and the DC Comics films, 
represent some of the most relevant movies produced and distributed by 
WarnerMedia. Its 13,9% market share makes them the second biggest studio in 
the US.  
Columbia Pictures is an American film studio and production and distribution 
company that is a member of the Sony Pictures Motion Picture Group, itself a 
subsidiary of the Japanese multinational conglomerate Sony. Spider-Man, James 
Bond were just some of the films that had the most impact on the “big screen”, in 
terms of sales. Columbia ends our list of The Walt Disney Studios major 
competitors within the industry, with a market share of 12,1%.  
Each studio is approaching the current situation differently, either due to 
divergence at the corporate level or due to its position in the field of streaming 
platforms. For example, both Sony Pictures (Columbia Pictures) and Paramount 
do not yet have streaming services in their portfolio to be able to offload their films, 
having therefore postponed most of their productions or sold to intermediaries 
streaming services, such as Netflix or Amazon Prime Video. Lastly, all the Big Five 
Studios are part of some conglomerate, therefore the lack of specific information 
made us look into a smaller, but independent film production and film distribution, 
Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation, which is an American-Canadian 
entertainment company, that produced and distributed high box office films such 
as, The Hunger Games, The Twilight Saga and many others. Even though this 
company does not make part of a huge conglomerate as the other, it was still 













o The Fall of The Traditional Cinema Model and The 
Switch to Streaming Video-On-Demand 
Since the arrival of Covid-19, people all around the world have been forced to 
quarantine themselves at home in a dramatic fashion, unlike almost any other time 
in history. Moreover, workers have been equally impacted by virtue of state-
imposed shutdowns that have affected innumerable businesses, including the film 
industry. The results of this shutdown have produced a near total eradication of 
Hollywood’s traditional production and distribution models in place preceding the 
global pandemic. Although the streaming video on demand marketplace has 
existed for some time, only recently has it adopted inhouse production studios of 
its own. In the ensuing months during which Hollywood has been shut down, those 
streaming networks have seen a substantial increase in demand, and thus, 
financial profitability, which foreshadow other more ominous consequences for 
Hollywood’s traditional system of production and distribution to retail cinemas. 
Given that tickets sold fell 83% over this period and production was reduced in 
similar proportions, much of the industry’s workforce (900 thousand professionals) 
were rendered unemployed overnight. 
Given this, Cinemark theaters experienced a similar impact with a tremendous 
decrease in revenue in 2020, and AMC theatres are on the verge of declaring 
bankruptcy (Hollywood Survival Strategies in the Post-COVID 19 Era, 2020). 
According to several reports, only half of Americans say they would go to a movie 
during opening weekend during the first few months of 2021 with 65% either very 
unlikely or somewhat unlikely to return to a movie theatre within one month of 
reopening. Consumer anxiety about the safety of theatre attendance is also 
complicated by the competing but slowly increasing affinity for immediate 
accessibility to their film or TV series on streaming networks that some younger 
demographics of consumers have become accustomed to. 
The global pandemic has exacerbated the steady decline of consumers interested 
and committed to seeing films in movie theatres. After decades of slow but steady 
decline in attendance (CAGR of -1,3%, 2002-2019) (Figure 57), most think movie 
theaters will have to innovate in a way other than raising ticket prices. 
The switch to streaming from the traditional theatre distribution system includes a 
financial incentive for studios that can eliminate the 50% profit that typically 
accrues to box office and satellite airing rights, thereby creating a significant 
source of revenue that otherwise might be reinvested elsewhere in “original” 
streaming content. Third party distribution through theatres and satellite with single 
ticket sales have rarely been as profitable as the predictably reoccurring revenue 
that streaming services generate. Combined with the other factors involved in the 
production and distribution costs of the past, the switch to streaming makes 












financial sense provided that enough numbers of consumers are predisposed to 
make the switch permanently. 
The desires of contemporary audiences to consume their entertainment through 
smart-TV’s and other portable devices linked to broadband connections, paired 
with an aversion to Covid-19 exposure has culminated in a dramatic change of 
fate for the Hollywood entertainment industry across television and film products. 
And that change would have happened anyway, were it not for an already pre-
existing phenomena like the fact that “The viewing habits of the post-television 
generation vary from platform to platform as different screens are used for 
different styles of viewing” and that “88% of Netflix users and 70% of Hulu+ users 
watch 3 or more episodes of the same television show in a day and 7 out of 10 
American television viewers describe themselves as binge viewers” (Strangelove 
2015, 127). 
While digital society are undoubtedly being fed a diet of on-demand content ready 
for their consumption, the conditions of our current quarantined state will not last 
forever, and even once Covid-19 disappears, behavioral psychologists believe that 
abandoning such easily obtained satisfaction is unlikely, and so far as these 
corporations, which dominate Hollywood, are concerned, they stand ready and 
willing to supply as much as one can consume for as long as there’s a desire and 
money to pay for their fee. 
Finally, and as our questionnaire shows, from a sample of 557 people from all 
over the world, only 27% of them admitted that, from now on, it would be "very 
unlikely" or "unlikely" to see a film debut through a platform of streaming, which 
also confirms this change in consumer preferences and the metamorphosis of the 
traditional cinema distribution system. 
o The Obsolescence of Physical Formats of Distribution  
Predicting the future of media is always complicated, but as of 2020, the streaming 
revolution is starting to pick up steam, and right now, it seems that streaming 
services are becoming the preferred way to watch film and television within the 
home. Physical media’s prevalence seems to become less and less an option as 
time goes on. With DVD sales declining and consumers willingly selling their 
libraries off to video rental stores, it doesn’t look too positive for the home library 
(Figure 58). The owners of the services are now choosing when you can and can’t 
have access to things. We already see this happening with Disney when they 
acquired Fox’s library. 
Additionally, the Motion Picture Association of America in its annual Theatrical 
Home Entertainment Market Environment report, described the sharp drop in 
sales of physical content distribution formats. According to IHS Markit data, global 
sales of video disc formats (meaning DVD, Blu-ray, and UltraHD Blu-ray) were 
Figure 58 - Disk sales and rentals revenue in the United 












$25 billion in 2014 but only $13 billion in 2018 (Figure 59). That's almost a 50% 
drop in four years. 
The arrival of streaming is starting to create a tremendous shift in the home library 
of Americans and also the worldwide population. The slow transition away from 
DVD and Blu-ray is shown in our forecast as we believe that this segment will 
become obsolete in the long-term. 
Drivers 
The trends discussed above are extremely relevant to understand how studio 
entertainment revenues were forecasted. Given this expected change in the way 
the films will be distributed and consumed by the mass audience in the future and 
taking into account the appearance of Disney+, we divided revenue sources into 2 
categories, theater related revenues and Disney+ films related revenue. 
The first assumption to understand is the decline in the number of people who 
choose to go to the cinema to see a film premiere instead of seeing it at home 
(Figure 60) through the acquisition of the film on the Disney+ platform (in 2020, 
Mulan was the pilot test of this new way to consume Disney films, costing $30). In 
2019, on average each Disney film was seen by 65 million people, so for projected 
number of Disney’s movie viewers we applied the growth rate of the population 
aged in their 30’s (from the regions that we find most relevant). After getting this 
number, we divided into the people who prefer to watch the films in the cinemas 
and people who choose to see at home. We believe that in 2021, 83% will 
continue to prefer going to the cinema, but we will see a gradual decrease as 
streaming platforms gain more and more ground. We expect that in 2035, we will 
see only 30% of people watching movies in theaters. 
In conclusion, considering that the number of films released will be close to the 
historical average (around 11 relevant films released each year) (Figure 61), the 
number of subscribers of the platform, the distribution between home-viewers and 
theater-viewers, and that an average family that subscribes Disney+ has 3 
members, we apply these rates and values thus obtaining the revenues of 
“theatrical distribution licensing”. 
Margins, Rates and Assets & Liabilities 
 
 
In Studio Entertainment, the change in the traditional model of film distribution will 
favor Disney, which in this way manages to cut costs and optimize its streaming 
platform. Therefore, as we see this phenomenon unfold, and more and more 
people are joining this new way of watching movies, we will also see the 
Figure 59 - Global sales of physical content distribution 
format, 2014-2018.  
Source: MPAA. 
Studio Entertainment 2020FY 2025FY 2030FY 2035FY
Revenues 9 636 15 061 18 040 20 913
Gross Margin 52% 64% 67% 69%
Core Result 1 774 3 926 5 483 7 155
Net Margin 18% 26% 30% 34%
FCF 1 547 2 691 3 846 5 036
WACC 7% 8% 8% 9%
ROIC 6% 10% 12% 13%
Investment Rate 13% 31% 30% 30%
Growth 1% 3% 4% 4%
2021F 2025F 2030F 2035F
% of movie theaters viewers 83% 65% 40% 30%
% of Disney + film viewers 17% 35% 60% 70%
Figure 60 - Distribution between people who watch film on 
Disney+ and on the theaters.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 61 - Number of blockbusters released by Disney 
each year, 2014-2020.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Table 8 - KPIs for Studio Entertainment segment.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
 
 








segment's ROIC increase considerably (Table 8), and the investment rate of this 
sector will not change significantly. 
The most relevant assets for this business model are the theatrical film cost 
advances and goodwill (the latter being a non-cash movement, so we have 
chosen to keep it constant). 
Regarding the discount rate of this segment and given that there are no relevant 
public competitors, we decided to give a weighting of 25/75 between the average 
of the comparables and Disney’s regression beta, resulting in a Ru of 8,2%. 
Lastly, and considering all drivers, trends, rates and other variables, we believe 
that a 3,9% growth in steady state, fits in with the long-term prospects of nominal 
growth for developed economies. 
Direct to Consumer & International 
Business Model 
DTCI includes, branded international channels, such as Disney, Fox (FX in the 
US), National Geographic, ESPN and Star. These channels produce local content 
or acquire rights from domestic studios and third parties. Information about the 
reach and number of these channels is presented in Figure 62, Figure 63 and 
Figure 64. The most recent segment within DTCI are the Direct-to-Consumer 
streaming services such as Disney+, ESPN+, Hulu and Hotstar Disney+. Disney+ 
has been rolled out to the USA, Canada, several European countries and will 
continue to expand to other European, Asian and Latin American countries. Hulu 
has been a US service but will in 2021 be rolled out to other countries (to be 
defined). ESPN+ is solely US based and will remain so in the short term. Hotstar 
Disney+ is the mostly Indian and southeast Asia version of Disney+ that also 
includes Indian content previously provided by Hotstar (productions by Star 
Studios). The subscription numbers of these services are presented in Figure 65. 
Besides the international channels and DTC business, DTCI operates digital 
content distribution platforms and services such as branded websites. Regarding 
the business model, international channels revenue sources and costs are similar 
to the ones in Media Networks. Revenues from affiliate fees are negotiated per 
subscriber with the MVPDs and advertising is contingent on the number of 
viewers. Regarding the DTC segment there are subscription fees, which are 
charged to the clients for the right to use the platform they subscribe to. There are 
also advertising revenues which are non-ratings based, meaning they can be 
targeted to specific viewer groups. This sort of advertising revenue is higher, in a 
per subscriber basis than the ratings-based advertising (Burguet & Petrikaite, 
2018). Hulu, has a plan for ASVOD and a simple subscription video on demand 
which is 30% more expensive. Hulu also operates a Live Tv service which works 
Figure 62 - Number of international TWDC channels 
subscribers, in 2020, in millions.  
Source: TWDC Annual report, 2020 
Figure 63 - International Disney branded channel 
subscribers, in millions.  
Source: TWDC Annual report, 2020 
Figure 64 - ESPN, Fox, National Geographic and Star 
branded channels subscribers, in millions. 
 Source: TWDC Annual report, 2020. 
Figure 65 - TDWC DTC platforms subscribers, in 
millions.  
Source: TWDC Annual report, 2020 
Figure 66 - US DTC platforms subscription price. 
Source: Each reported company's website, 2020 
 
 








as a vMVPD. Disney+ operates in a SVOD business model (with the exception for 
premiere films like Mulan which was operated in a TVOD model) and ESPN+ due 
to the nature of live sports, operates in a ASVOD model. US monthly price points 
are presented in Figure 66. 
Market Overview and Competitors 
The International part of the segment is inhabited by all the US firms who operate 
cable channels outside the US and also all the national companies that operate 
entertainment, sports, lifestyle and other cable channels. Disney operates branded 
channels in over 160 countries, so it faces national competition on each of those 
countries. Comparable results with other US firms are presented in Figure 67 and 
Table 99. Disney’s DTCI segment includes the growing subscription platforms 
which creates unreliable data on ROIC in 2020.  
The Direct-to-Consumer (mainly OTT) market where Disney is inserted is divided 
between SVOD, AVOD, TVOD and vMVPD platforms. In the SVOD market there 
exists Disney+, Netflix, Apple TV+, Amazon Prime Video, Peacock, HBO Max, 
Hulu and other smaller players. Hulu Live TV operates in a smaller market where 
traditional MVPD’s are been challenged by virtual providers who incur in lower 
costs of providing the product. In 2019 there were 642 million OTT subscribers 
and Digital TV estimates that by 2025 there will be 1161 million subscribers 
(Figure 68) which implies a 10% CAGR which is consistent with the subscription 
forecasted revenue in the model with a 10% CAGR in the explicit period. 
Regarding revenue from all these OTT platforms data is not available for most 
services. Disney’s 2020 subscription revenue was $7,6 billion compared to 
$23,819 billion from Netflix. Once again, comparing WACC’s we can see that 2019 
Disney’s WACC was 8,1% compared to Netflix’s 10,53%, which is expected as 
DTC is a stronger more volatile segment. As a final note, this segment is 
populated by traditional Media players such as Disney, companies that were not in 
the M&E industry such as Amazon and also companies like Netflix that did not 
host traditional channels before. 
Regarding the international channels competitors, National Geographic directly 
rivals channels such as Discovery Channel; Disney Channel rivals with 
Nickelodeon (ViacomCBS), Cartoon Network (AT&T) and other junior 
entertainment channels from each country. Fox rivals with channels such as Syfy 
(Comcast), AXN (Sony) and other content that runs in each individual country. On 
Figure 69, we can see the revenue from other US cable channel owners, this 
revenue only represents income from international channels. Regarding EBITDA 
margins, the average is presented in Table 9. 
 
9 Data in relation to ROIC does not include AMC Networks and Discovery Inc. The ROIC and WACC presented by TWDC is only represented by DTCI segment. 
Average KPI All US International Cable Comps TWDC DTCI
Revenue from International 6 974 5 425
EBITDA Margin 17% N/A
Overall Company's ROIC* 9,64% -3,10%
Overall Company's WACC 5,33% 9,06%
Table 9 - KPI's of TWDC International channels 
segment and also comparable firms.  
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Figure 68 - Past and expected SVOD subscribers, in 
millions.  
Source: Digital TV Research, 2019 
Figure 69 - 2019 Revenue from international channels. 
Source: Each company's annual report, 2019 
Figure 67 - Comparable firms EBITDA margin in 2019. 
Source: Analyst estimates 
Figure 70 - Number of DTC platform subscribers in 
2019, in millions.  












Regarding DTC and, SVOD, the largest competitor to Hulu and Disney+ at the 
moment is Netflix (Figure 7010). Netflix is an established service that besides the 
content acquired, has started developing its own content, and since then, 
launched 2769 hours of original content (Statista, 2019). Currently, it has content 
assets of over 24 billion dollars and spreads its content in 190 countries (Netflix, 
2019). Its worldwide ARPU was $10,82 (Netflix, 2019) and its US ARPU was 
$13,4. Netflix has been increasing from 2017 to 2019 its gross margin from 
28,54% to 37,36% whilst the EBITDA margin was 12% in 2019. The overall 
number of subscribers is presented in Figure 70 and the US pricing is presented in 
Figure 71. 
Another competitor in the SVOD environment is AT&T’s HBO Max. This service, 
similarly, to Netflix is preponderantly targeted to the age group 18-49 
(Cordcutters,2019 and businessofapps,2019). AT&T acquired the HBO brand, 
when the company acquired Warner Bros. Similarly, to Disney, HBO has already a 
vast library of content due to the other businesses of Warner Bros and Turner, this 
vast library meant HBO Max launched with 10000 hours of content.  
The competitor with the largest library in terms of movies and tv shows (Reelgood, 
2020) is Prime Video, we can see the number of movies divided by high and low 
quality in Figure 72 and Figure 73. This SVOD service was the solution Amazon 
found to enter the streaming environment. Amazon Prime is a service that 
improves customer care and delivery speed in Amazon supported countries, 
Amazon Prime Video is the SVOD platform. Users who pay for Amazon Prime 
automatically have access to Amazon Prime Video for no extra charge, however 
non-Amazon Prime users can subscribe to the Prime Video for $8,99. Amazon 
Prime as a whole has over 150 million worldwide subscribers with a monthly cost 
of $12,99. However Media Post estimates that only 26 million of the US Prime 
subscribers use Prime Video in the US. 
Another competitor which was not in the MN segment but has started a SVOD 
service is Apple, with the Apple TV+ service. The service was launched November 
first, 2019 and according to Apple is now available in over 100 countries. The 
number of subscribers (Figure 70) are boosted by the 1 year free membership 
offered by Apple on every phone, tablet or computer purchase. 
The final big SVOD service is Peacock by Comcast, which is the most recent 
service that has been launched on the 15th of July 2020. This service includes 
NBC content and Universal Studios theatrical productions. The service currently is 
only available in the US but will roll out to the EU in the future. 
Viacom and CBS merged in 2019, with this, the newly formed ViacomCBS, is 
managing CBS All access and Showtime OTT. The first service which is solely 
 
10 Data for Disney DTC platforms and Netflix is in 2020. 
Figure 71 - US DTC platforms price (Basic SVOD). 
Source: Each company's DTC website 
Figure 72 - High quality movie catalog, September 
2020. 
Source: Statista, 2020 
Figure 73 - Low quality movie catalog, September 2020.  
Source: Statista, 2020 
Figure 74 - vMVPD's number of subscribers, in 2020, in 
millions.  
Source: Fierce video, 2020 












available in the USA, costs $9,99 without advertising and Showtime OTT $10,99. 
The combined number of subscribers is around 15 million. ViacomCBS will 
rebrand CBS All Access to Paramount+ in order to create a larger competitive 
player within the SVOD market, this player will have a huge library of theatrical 
productions by Paramount Studios. ViacomCBS also owns PlutoTV which is an 
AVOD platform with 28 million users.  
TWDC’S Hulu Live TV, faces competition within the vMVPD segment. Besides 
competing with much larger traditional MVPD’s it also faces other vMVPD’s. The 
vMVPD's market has reached 10M total subscribers according to Fierce Video, 
with the biggest player being Disney’s Hulu. The subscriber count is shown on 
Figure 74. 
Regarding revenues and margins of competitors, this is a market with low levels of 
transparency. Besides Netflix, which solely focuses on SVOD (has a small legacy 
business) there is no information on most OTT platforms margins or even 
revenue. In some businesses, not even ARPU’s are divulged. Also, besides, 
Netflix, no firm can be a proxy for the segment of DTCI, as the OTT portion of their 
businesses is small. 
Valuation 
Trends 
o Accesability to Online Video Content 
In 2020 the number of internet users was 4,8 billion (Statista, 2020) and in the 
past decade the CAGR was of 7,9% (Figure 75). In 2020 59% of the world 
population had access to the internet and the growth in expected population with 
internet access (3,3% according to ITU) surpasses the growth in global population 
which according to UN DESA data is 1% per year in the next 10 years (Figure 76). 
For this reason, organic growth is expected for DTC solutions as developing 
countries will gain access to subscription services, mainly with their mobile 
phones, Figure 77 and Figure 78. TWDC announced in the Q4 investor call that 
Hotstar Disney+ already accounts for a quarter of Disney+ subscriptions which is 
the reflection of this adoption. 
Revenue Drivers 
When forecasting the revenues for the DTCI segment the model splits between 
the international channels and the streaming platforms. For the international 
channels the same logic mentioned in the MN for the national cable networks is 
applied. The three scenarios are also assumed, and the channels decrease their 
number of subscribers with the same percentage change applied in the national 
channels (Table 10). The weighted average number of subscribers (in accordance 
Figure 76 - World population, past and forecasted, in 
billions.  
Source: UN DESA, 2020 
Figure 77 - Mobile internet users in Southern Asia, in 
billions.  
Source: Statista, 2020 
Figure 78 - Internet penetration rate worldwide, in 2020, 
by region.  
Source: We Are Social; DataReportal; Hootsuite; ITU; 
GlobalWebIndex; GSMA Intelligence; APJII; Kepios, 
2020 
Disney ESPN FOX NG Star
Drastic Change to DTCI -3,76% -3,76% -3,76% -3,76% -3,76%
Modest Change to DTCI -2,60% -1,52% -1,88% -2,60% -2,00%
Slight Change to DTCI -1,00% -1,00% -1,00% -1,00% -1,00%
advertising DTC real growth organic DTC services 2020/2027 organic DTC services last 2027+
Drastic Change to DTCI 4,00% 2,02% 0,50%
Modest Change to DTCI 3,00% 2,02% 0,50%
Slight Change to DTCI 2,00% 2,02% 0,50%
TV/SVOD Distrubuting Licensing Advertising Channels Affiliate Fees
Drastic Change to DTCI -25,00% -2,00% -3,00%
Modest Change to DTCI -15,00% -1,00% -2,00%
Slight Change to DTCI -5,00% -0,50% -1,00%
Table 10 - Assumed scenarios in the DTCI segment. 
Source: Analyst estimates 
 
 








with the percentage scenarios, Figure 79) is then multiplied by the average affiliate 
fee per subscriber which evolves in accordance with the inflation rate, to obtain the 
international channels affiliate fees. For the advertising in these channels the 
amount earned per subscriber (paid by firms who advertise in the company’s 
channels) is expected to decrease (eMarketer, 2019) in accordance with the 
change to DTC.  
Regarding the streaming channels the drivers are the yearly ARPU (Figure 81) 
and the number of subscribers. The evolution of the ARPU depends on the 
inflation rate (world) and also depends on the long-term value of the service. 
Disney+ currently is selling under-price in comparison to the competitors, which is 
a strategy for capturing subscribers in the short term. When analysing the long 
term ARPU (without advertising) of Hulu and Disney+, which is consistent with the 
true cost of content plus margin, it should be closer to the ARPU of Netflix (Figure 
80). The factors that make Disney+ and Hulu ARPU in the long term lower than 
Netflix is the bundle potential that Disney has and is already implementing, which 
diminishes per service ARPU. In accordance with the results from the survey we 
performed, the ARPU applies a risk factor that considers if users will be shown 
advertising (30% discount on the monthly fee) or not. When discussing the ARPU 
of ESPN+, investors must bear in mind that although ESPN has been a cash cow 
for Disney it is also the most expensive channel to operate due to the cost of 
owning the rights for certain sports events. In 2019 it is estimated that 
approximately $22 billion were spent on sports rights (Media.sportsbusiness, 
2019). Currently it is estimated that the affiliate fee per subscriber that MVPD’s 
pay for ESPN is between 7 and 12 dollars, this cost will also exist in the DTC 
solution. However, currently ESPN+ doesn’t transmit certain expensive sports 
such as NFL. In the future, if ESPN+ becomes the main content provider, it will 
raise its subscription fees in order to be able to support the sports rights licenses. 
Regarding the number of subscribers per platform, besides assuming that the cord 
cutters will subscribe to the respective DTC content providers (from 2028 onwards 
the total amount of subscribers lost by traditional channels isn’t totally absorbed in 
DTC), there is also an expected organic growth percentage that accounts for 
factors such as the population with access to online content. From 2030 onwards, 
the subscriber growth is consistent with the expected GDP growth. 
Regarding the advertising revenues, the model assumes that the per subscriber 
advertising value is 50% the value currently received in the national cable 
channels and 50% from the international cable channels and it goes in line with 
the world inflation (regarding the per subscriber ad value). The other revenue 
factors of DTCI are expected to converge to 0 as they represent Home 
Entertainment and TV/SVOD distributing licensing which are areas where Disney 
Figure 83 - Forecasted, 2035, subscription revenues, in 
millions of USD.  
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Figure 81 - TWDC DTC services yearly ARPU, in 
dollars.  
Source: TWDC Annual report, 2020 
Figure 80 - Netflix monthly ARPU, worldwide.  
Source: Netflix Annual report, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 
Figure 82 - Forecasted DTCI revenues, in millions USD. 
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Figure 79 - Weighted average number of international 
channel subscribers, non-recurrent, in millions.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
 
 








is disinvesting. The overall forecasted revenues are presented in Figure 82. The 
2035 subscription revenue is represented in Figure 83.  
Covid-19 is also not affecting DTCI revenue as, through the same analysis 
performed in the previous segments, no correlations are visible, Figure 84. 
Margins, Rates and Assets & Liabilities 
Regarding DTCI, current operating margins are not reflecting a steady status. 
Firstly, due to the consolidation of TFCF and Hulu, the 2019 results were 
misrepresented. Due to the recent additions of Disney+ and the investments made 
in the platform (and also the other streaming solutions) the net income is as 
expected to be negative and will be so in the coming years as Disney keeps 
investing in the platforms. In 2020, Programming and Production Costs accounted 
for 58% of revenues, which is 10% higher than the results in Media Networks and 
the overall gross margin was almost 20% lower in DTCI (Figure 85). If we included 
SG&A expenses the DTCI net margin is negative and Media Networks was 28% 
which implies that the margins in DTCI do not represent the long-term status. The 
long-term net margin the model assumes for DTCI is slightly larger than the Media 
Networks, in order to represent the higher control from content creation to the end 
user on an OTT market. The SG&A margins for DTCI, in comparison to Netflix 
(Figure 86) are lower, this is because of the conglomerate effect on DTC. As Mr. 
Walt Disney predicted in the original business model, each division works for one 
another and therefore DTCI does not need the same investment in marketing as 
Netflix. However, the competition that is present and the one that will still enter, 
this market is bound to become more competitive than the Media Networks and 
the marketing costs (included in SG&A) and costs to acquire external content 
reflect this competitiveness. Information solely on the international cable channels 
is presented in Table 11 and general DTCI KPI’s are presented in Table 13. 
Regarding the return on assets that this segment has, the model assumes it as 
represented 2/3 by Disney’s regression beta and 1/3 of Netflix’s unlevered beta. In 
this segment we did not assume a uniform split, as the only comparable firm is 
Netflix. The current WACC (2020) for DTCI is 9,06% and the ROIC -3,09%, due to 
the investment phase the firm is currently on. In the steady state the WACC is 
expected to increase to 13% (the model assumes all segments have the same 
capital structure) and the ROIC is expected to increase to 25%, which is 
representative of the value creation of DTCI. This gap is explained by the potential 
this segment has in developing. Through new forms of reaching the end user, with 
little to no intermediation. This result is consistent with our nominal g in the steady 
state being 4,7%, which is larger than the expected US nominal growth rate.  
Regarding the sensitive caption of Television Costs, Rights and Advances, the 
same regression method used in MN was applied. Netflix with approximately 190 
Figure 84 - COVID cases and DTCI revenues. 
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Figure 85 - DTCI Margins.  
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Figure 86 - Netflix's 2019 operating margins. 
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Average KPI All US International Cable Comps TWDC DTCI
Revenue from International 6 974 5 425
EBITDA Margin 17% N/A
Overall Company's ROIC* 9,64% -3,09%
Overall Company's WACC 5,33% 9,06%
Table 11 - KPI's for DTCI segment and US international 
cable channel providers.  




F stat 90,9184388 3,00
ssreg 74169030,7 2447326,36
Regression with y= television rights and content and x= revenues
Table 12 - Regression analysis between Revenues and 
Television costs rights and advances.  
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
DTCI 2020FY 2025FY 2030FY 2035FY
Revenues 16 967 43 036 67 955 89 463
Gross Margin 11% 38% 48% 53%
Core Result (2 091) 5 884 14 812 22 343
Net Margin -12% 14% 22% 25%
FCF 4 317 2 346 10 779 18 059
WACC 9% 11% 12% 13%
ROIC -6,52% 11,47% 20,92% 24,69%
Investment Rate 306,47% 60,12% 27,22% 19,17%
Growth -20,00% 6,90% 5,70% 4,73%
Table 13 - KPI's for DTCI segment.  
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
 
 








million users had, in 2019, $24,5 billion in content assets, for that reason, the 
model uses the higher interval from the CI (0,53) as the coefficient (Table 12).  
Intangible assets in the DTCI are representative of character value, brands, 
international MVPD agreements and others. Although the latter is expected to 
decrease, the model contemplates an annual investment for intangible assets in 
order to cover the possibility of Disney acquiring certain characters or franchises.  
Regarding NWC, as this business is heavily based on cash before service, as the 
subscriptions are paid in the beginning of the 30 day or 1-year usable period, the 
level of deferred revenue is quite high and the NWC activity acts as a financing 
source with a negative cash conversion cycle (Figure 87). 
Macro Overview 
2020 was undoubtedly a very atypical year, with Covid-19 entering our lives and 
affecting in a way or another the way we work, how we entertain ourselves, how 
we socialize, our life in general. But other macroeconomic events must be 
addressed as they play a crucial role in assessing companies’ valuation and their 
future as a company facing this panorama. 
Covid-19 epidemic began in January 2020 in what is believed to be in the Wuhan 
province of China. By March epidemiologists at the WHO later characterized 
Covid-19 as a pandemic. As a result of this pandemic, many countries and regions 
had to impose quarantines, entry bans, or other restrictions for citizens, prevent 
their own citizens from travelling overseas to control the spread of the virus in the 
most affected areas. Together with a decreased willingness to travel, the 
restrictions have had a negative economic and social impact on the travelling and 
hospitality sectors of those regions. 
At the time of this research submission over 1,5 million people have died and over 
72 million cases have been confirmed worldwide (Figure 88) (Figure 89). 
Given this, the adverse impact of Covid-19 on TWDC businesses will continue for 
an unknown length of time and may continue to impact certain key sources of 
revenue, as the company has business interests in areas that involve mass 
gatherings including its theme parks and film releases. Nonetheless, other areas 
including its streaming service and the television brands might benefit from the 
social isolation. Theme parks were closed or operating at significantly reduced 
capacity for a significant portion of the year (Table 14), cruise ship sailings, guided 
tours and stage play performances were suspended since late in the second 
quarter, and retail stores were closed for a significant portion of the year. In 
addition, Disney has delayed or, in some instances shortened or cancelled, 
theatrical releases and have experienced adverse impacts on advertising sales 
and on our merchandise licensing business. (Disney Annual Report, 2020) 
Figure 87 - DTCI investment in NWC, in millions. 
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Figure 88 - Mapa Mundi of the most and least affected 
countries by Covid-19.  
Source: World Meters info, 2020. 
Figure 89 - Number of cumulative cases of Covid-19 
worldwide since January 8th.  
Source: World Meters info, 2020. 
Walt Disney World Resort 15/03 - 10/07
Disneyland Resort 14/03 - ….
Disneyland Paris 14/03 - 14/07 and 30/10 - ….
Hong Kong Disneyland Resort 26/01 - 17/06 and 15/07 - 24/09 
Shangai Disney Resort 25/01 - 10/05
Tokyo Disney Resort 29/02 - 30/06
Disney Cruise Line 14/03 - ….
Table 14 - PE&P's operations closing period due to covid-
19.  
Source TWDC annual report, 2020. 
 
 








Recent news on the efficacy of Covid-19 vaccines has indeed come as welcome 
news, but we know that a vast distribution program remains several months away. 
Scientists and health experts indicate that vaccines will be available to the majority 
of the population, in developed countries, around the second quarter of 2021. So 
we believe that 2021, despite being a much more positive year for Disney, than 
the previous one, we will only see park attendance values return to normal in mid-
2022, by which time we believe most of the population will feel safe, health wise, 
both for traveling and attending mass gathering locations, as shown in our 
valuation. 
In November, Joe Biden defeated the incumbent president Donald Trump in the 
2020 presidential election and will be inaugurated as the 46th president on 
January 2021, and will likely have to work with a Republican Senate majority, 
limiting his ability to implement the Democratic fiscal agenda. Nevertheless, Biden 
pledged to raise the corporate tax rate to 28% from 21% (Figure 90), which was 
incorporated in our valuation for future years. 
Given the current panorama, global economy is expected to slow -3,8% (YoY%) in 
2020, with sectors such as airlines, restaurants and movie theaters being most 
affected by this pandemic. While sectors related to Internet, TV, and Mail-Order 
Retailers were the top performers. The regions where Disney operates with 
greater preponderance are North America (representing 80% of revenue), Europe 
(11%) and Asia Pacific (9%). The three regions had and will have impacts of 
different scale on their economies. The least affected, Asia Pacific, as it was the 
first to be affected by the pandemic, managed to contain the number of cases 
better and presents more optimistic values for the GDP growth. On the other hand, 
North America and Europe, which are currently experiencing a 2nd wave of Covid 
cases, had started to take containment measures later so their economies 
suffered the most. (Figure 91). 
Key Risks 
Covid-19, is logically a risk that the company faces, especially in the PE&P 
segment. This risk is discussed in greater depth in the macro overview segment. 
For a global company such as Disney, exchange rate risk is significant, (Figure 
92) however, the company, incorporates this risk in the regular derivatives 
hedging. 
A risk that is tied to Disney’s core business, is the theatrical content success. 
Figure 93 represents the original business model created by Mr. Walt Disney 
himself, and the key factor is every business unit works for one another and the 
core is the theatrical productions. If the theatrical productions do not do as well, 
the rest of the business units will also suffer, as less people will visit parks, 
Figure 90 - Evolution of US corporate tax rate, since 1980.  
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and 
Product Accounts data, 2020. 
Figure 91 - Real GDP growth (YoY%), by region.  
Source: Bloomberg Estimates. 
Figure 92 - EUR/USD exchange rate.  
Source: Bloomberg, 2020 
Figure 93 - Original business model planned by Mr.Walt 
Disney.  
Source: Business Insider, 2015 
 
 








subscribe to services and others. Disney has, in the past, had periods with less 
success than the competitors, for example the end of the 90’s begging of the 
2000’s, where it was losing market share to Pixar (Figure 94). This effect has been 
accounted for, in the number of above $100 million box office films Disney is 
expected to release every year, which represents an average of good and bad 
years. 
A risk that is tied to the increase in importance of the DTC business is the piracy 
impact and mooching11. DataProt estimates the annual global revenue lost in the 
movie industry, to Piracy, is between $40 and $97,1 billion, which is only expected 
to become worst as more content is provided in digital platforms. In 2018 DataProt 
found there were over 190 billion visits in pirate sites, the main country sources 
are presented in Figure 95. DataProt estimates 50% of these visits were to 
streaming services. In relation to mooching, Cordcutting has discovered that 
approximately 15% of people use other individual’s credentials. Both this effects 
are already expected by DTC providers and the pricing already incorporates this 
event. 
Capital Structure 
Given the peer companies that we have selected for TWDC, we can observe that 
Disney’s 0,24 D/E, in Market Values, is one of the lowest among its comparables. 
As we have decided to value Disney as a sum of parts, we can notice that Media 
Networks (median D/E of 0,46) (Figure 97), Parks, Experiences and Products 
(median of 1,33) (Figure 96) and Studio Entertainment (median of 0,75) (Figure 
98) are the segments that have higher capital needs, while DTCI has a very low 
debt profile (median of 0,14).  As Disney will become more oriented towards its 
DTCI business we are expecting the debt levels to decrease in the long-term. 
While Disney has a strong liquidity position (Table 15), their goal is to return to 
levels consistent with a single A credit rating, as stated by Bob Iger in the 4Q 2020 
earnings webcast. As part of that commitment and given limited visibility due to 
Covid-19 and decision to prioritize investment in DTC initiatives, the board has 
decided to forego payment of a semi-annual dividend in January 2021. Capital 
allocation strategy will continue to prioritize investing in the growth of the four 
businesses, particularly in the direct-to-consumer segment. However, we 
anticipate the payment of a dividend will remain a part of the long-term capital 
allocation strategy following the return to a normalized operating environment. We 
believe that in the long-term the distribution of dividends (payout ratio) will go in 
line with their historical average of 25,7%, as shown in our valuation. 
 
11 Mooching is the event of a DTC user using another’s person account credentials for viewing content, without paying. 
Figure 94 - Disney's box offixe Market share in the US. 
Source: The numbers, 2020 
Figure 95 - Visits to Piracy websites in 2018, in billions. 
Source: DataProt, 2019 
Figure 97 - Comparison of the D/E of Media Network peer 
companies.  
Source: Bloomberg data. 
Figure 96 - Comparison of the D/E of PE&P peer 
companies.  
Source: Bloomberg data. 
Figure 98 - Comparison of the D/E of Studio Entertainment 
and DTCI peer companies.  
Source: Bloomberg data. 
 
 








In November 2020, Disney credit rating was downgraded to BBB+ (S&P). Even 
though it maintains a solid liquidity position, the S&P credit rating company have 
downgraded Disney during the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2019, interest coverage 
was very solid as well rounding 13x, meaning that Disney EBIT is almost 13 times 
higher than their interest expense responsibilities. Due to Covid-19, in 2020, this 
ratio was close to 0x, but in 2021 we will see this ratio returning to pre-Covid 
values. 
Discount Rates 
The valuation method chosen was the APV, for the advantages of modelling a 
varying debt structure. For this reason, the discount rate necessary is the cost of 
unlevered equity. Due to the structure of the company, with the 4 distinct 
segments, the valuation has been done with 4 different discount rates 
representing each BU’s asset risk. For the tax shields an average of the segments 
was calculated for an Ru that represents the whole firm. Financial and non-core 
assets or liabilities were included at book value. The strategy chosen for achieving 
a discount rate for each business unit was to find comparable firms in each 
industry and average the unlevered betas. To obtain a true beta for Disney’s 
segments we combined the industry competitor’s beta (Table 16) with Disney’s 
beta obtained from a regression with 5 years’ monthly data against the S&P500 
(Table 17). We weighted the 2 beta sources in different manners, depending on 
the segments competitors, this way the industry specific beta we obtain, includes a 
risk discount due to the conglomerate effect (Gatzert, Schmeiser 2011). When 
obtaining Disney’s beta from the regression the beta of debt used for un-levering 
was obtained through the CAPM with the risk-free rate of 2,84% consistent with a 
10Y US treasury bond plus inflation and an MRP estimated by KMPG assets. The 
cost of debt was calculated in consistency with Corporate Default and Recovery 
Rates, 1920-2011, with a YTM of 2,14% which represents a weighted average of 
1-30Y Disney public traded bonds (Table 18).  
The summary of each segment βU and RU is presented in Table 16. This table 
already includes the beta of Disney through the regression (1,08) and the average 
unlevered beta for the comparables presented in Table 16. 
Regarding the continuing value, each business unit has a different ROIC and 
reinvestment rate therefore a different perpetuity growth rate. The ROIC and g are 
presented in Table 19. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We performed a sensitivity analysis to understand how sensitive each segment is 
to variations (of 0,5% each way) in their cost of assets and the growth rate on the 
Solvency Ratios 2017FY 2018FY 2019FY 2020FY
Quick Ratio 74% 86% 84% 126%
Current Ratio 81% 94% 90% 132%
Cash Ratio 21% 23% 17% 67%
Table 15 - Disney's solvency ratios evolution.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Maturity Billions Yield
  -1 to 2 yrs (10) 3,86 2,04
  -2 to 3 yrs (8) 1,24 1,96
  -3 to 5 yrs (22) 6,82 2,27
  -5 to 7 yrs (20) 7,82 2,60
  -7 to 10 yrs (18) 5,05 2,51
  -10 to 20 yrs (39) 10,41 3,06
  -20 to 30 yrs (22) 9,75 3,37
  -30+ yrs (10) 4,68 3,71
53,15 2,75%
Table 16 - Comparable firms data.  
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
βu Ru
Media Network 0,87 8,72%
Parks, Experiences & Products 0,93 9,12%
Studio Entertainment 0,79 8,19%
Direct to Consumer & International 0,89 8,83%
Table 17 - Regression of Disney's stock returns 
against the S&P500.  
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Table 18 - Disney's bond issuances.  
Source: Bloomberg, 2020 
ROIC Growth
Media Networks 6,93% -0,32%
Parks, Experiences and Products 19,98% 4,48%
Studio Entertainment 13,13% 3,89%
Direct to Consumer & International 24,69% 4,73%
Corporate -27,91% 2,89%
Aggregate Operating Excluding Corporate 17,66% 3,52%
Table 19 - 2035 forecasted perpetuity growth and ROIC. 
Source: Analyst estimates, 2020 
Share Price -1,5% -1% -0,5% Δ g 0,5% 1% 1,5%
-1,5% 243 267 298 339 400 494 666
-1% 212 229 252 281 320 377 466
-0,5% 186 200 216 237 265 302 355
Δ Ru 165 176 188 204 224 249 284
0,5% 148 156 166 178 192 211 235
1% 133 139 147 156 168 182 199
1,5% 120 125 131 139 148 158 171
Table 20 - Sensitivity analysis on Disney's share price. 
















perpetuity. We aggregated the results in order to visualize the possibilities of share 
price in accordance to the changes in these parameters. The results are 
presented in Table 20. The highest possible share price in this analysis came to 
$666 which represents an increase in all segments g’s of 1,5% and a decrease in 
each Ru of 1,5%. The opposite scenario leaves us with a share price of $120. 
Relative Valuation 
To perform a relative valuation, several companies, that operate in the same 
industries as Disney, were selected. We believe that only few companies are 
relatively close to Disney’s business operations as a whole, those being Comcast 
and Viacom, as these have segments in Media Networks, Parks (Viacom does 
not), Studio and Streaming. Therefore, we decided to choose some companies 
that operate in those segments alone. This approach is not very precise, as 
Disney benefits from the dynamics between the different segments, and the fact 
that it is a conglomerate comes with a better risk diversification, as the success or 
failure of one segment will affect the others. 
We think that these multiples valuation does not in any way reflect the way a 
company like Disney should be evaluated, since it operates in industries that have  
little or nothing to do with each other and because it is in a phase of extreme 
change, with the appearance of their streaming platform. Given these facts, we 
undoubtably think that the best way to do a valuation of TDWC is through a DCF 
of the Sum of Parts. 
Moreover, the current panorama, with Covid-19, metrics like P/E, EV/NOPLAT or 
EV/EBITDA are distorted, due to the negative results that mature companies 
operating in the hospitality and entertainment industries are presenting, which 
makes it impossible to execute these same metrics. Despite this, we decided to 
use two forward metrics that takes into account the future results of the selected 
peers (based on the consensus of several researchers, taken from Bloomberg) 
and Disney itself (based on our projections), EV/EBITDA FY2 and P/E FY2. This 
way we obtain normalized results and thus surpass the Covid-19 obstacle.  
Through the EV/EBITDA FY2 (Table 21), when we apply the 2-year forward 
multiple to the respective EBITDA from each segment we get a Price per Share of 
$171,36 in 30th of September (end of Disney’s 2021 Fiscal Year, our targeted 
valuation date). Lastly, in order to execute the P/E FY2 approach (Table 22), we 
take into account the multiples from our peers and apply it to the respective EPS 




Parks, Experiences and Produtcs 23,7
Studio Entertainment 15,7
Direct to consumer and International 30,0
Table 21 - Segment's EV/EBITDA FY2 multiples.  
Source: Bloomberg Estimates. 
P/E FY2 Multiples
Media Networks 10,3
Parks, Experiences and Produtcs 48,8
Studio Entertainment 28,3
Direct to consumer and International 50,2
Table 22 - Segment's P/E FY2 multiples.  
Source: Bloomberg Estimates. 
 
 








Looking at the company as a whole (Table 23), we can observe that ROIC grows 
at a steady pace (reaching 18% in steady state), which is mainly supported by 
DTCI and its growing platform, Disney+, and Studio Entertainment that will favor 
with the new dynamics of market that are affecting the film industry. 
Regarding NOPLAT, despite the negative effect of Media Networks, it will increase 
at a CAGR of 9%, being the biggest contributor to this growth, DTCI with the 
expected large-scale adhesion by the public and the steady growth (as seen in the 
previous years) of Parks, Experiences and Products, that will continue to provide 
value for its shareholders (Figure 99). 
We forecast an average investment rate of 37% in the 2021-2025 period, reaching 
20% in the long term. Thus, resulting in a long-term nominal growth rate (3,5%) for 
Disney that is in line with the growth of developed economies. 
Even though Disney is trading close to our target price, we believe that the market 
is not considering the benefits of Disney as a whole and the fact that the success 
of one segment will mean the success of another. Therefore, our model 
contemplates the deterioration of MN in the long run, however our expectations for 
DTCI becoming the forefront of Disney's revenues counterbalance the 
disappearance of the MN segment, and although PE&P is currently facing great 
adversities, in the long run it will maintain its cash-cow status. The new model for 
distributing films, despite still a bit unclear and in an embryonic stage, has 
enormous potential for companies like Disney. And therefore, based on our 
Adjusted Present Value Valuation, we reached a Market Cap of $ 369,34 billions, 
resulting in a price per share of $ 204,05 (Table 24). 
The closing stock price for Disney (DIS) was $ 181,18 as of January 4th 2021, 
indicating it is trading at discount of 9,3%. Thus, our final recommendation to 





















PE&P 2020FY 2025FY 2030FY 2035FY
Revenues 71 498 117 142 151 868 183 878
Gross Margin 32% 47% 52% 55%
Core Result 5 618 23 027 35 491 46 825
Net Margin 8% 20% 23% 25%
FCF 13 179 15 384 27 149 37 499
ROIC 4% 13% 16% 18%
Investment Rate -135% 33% 24% 20%
Growth -5% 4% 4% 4%
Table 23 - KPIs for TDWC.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Figure 99 - TWDC Revenue distribution in 2019 Vs 2035.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
Market Capitalization 369 337$        
Target Price 204,05$          
Price 04/01/2021 181,18$          
Expected Return 9,3%
Recommendation Hold
Table 24 – Disney Final Valuation.  
Source: Analyst Estimates. 
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2017FY 2018FY 2019FY 2020FY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024FY 2025FY 2026FY 2027FY 2028FY 2029FY 2030FY 2031FY 2032FY 2033FY 2034FY 2035FY
CORE OPERATIONS
Media Networks
Revenue from Media Networks 21 299 21 922 24 827 28 393 26 885 25 551 24 464 23 550 22 746 22 042 21 413 20 861 20 351 19 873 19 406 18 955 18 516 18 084 17 656
Affiliate fees 11 324 11 907 13 433 15 018 14 794 14 568 14 354 14 138 13 905 13 669 13 430 13 200 12 967 12 729 12 479 12 225 11 966 11 702 11 433
forecasted in drivers Media Networks
Advertising 6 938 6 586 6 965 6 374 6 679 6 593 6 513 6 431 6 342 6 252 6 160 6 072 5 983 5 891 5 794 5 694 5 593 5 489 5 383
forecasted in drivers Media Networks
TV/SVOD distribution licensing 3 037 3 120 4 046 6 489 5 159 4 130 3 332 2 710 2 223 1 840 1 536 1 295 1 101 945 819 715 629 558 499
forecasted in drivers Media Networks
Other 0 309 383 512 254 259 265 270 276 282 288 294 301 307 314 321 328 335 342
forecasted in drivers Media Networks
Revenues from Eliminations (454) (471) (1 580) (3 814) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forecasted as 0, as it is a non cash expense
Operating Expenses (12 754) (13 197) (15 499) (17 387) (16 177) (15 376) (14 728) (14 185) (13 707) (13 289) (12 915) (12 589) (12 287) (12 002) (11 722) (11 450) (11 182) (10 917) (10 652)
Programming and Production Costs (9 689) (10 124) (12 535) (14 666) (13 574) (12 901) (12 352) (11 890) (11 484) (11 129) (10 812) (10 533) (10 275) (10 034) (9 798) (9 570) (9 349) (9 131) (8 915)
% of revenues 45% 46% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Payroll (2 380) (2 431) (2 162) (1 888) (1 763) (1 677) (1 612) (1 559) (1 511) (1 471) (1 435) (1 404) (1 375) (1 347) (1 317) (1 287) (1 255) (1 222) (1 186)
forecasted in drivers Media Networks
Other (685) (642) (802) (833) (840) (798) (764) (736) (711) (689) (669) (652) (636) (621) (606) (592) (579) (565) (552)
% of revenues 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Expenses Eliminations 460 469 1 438 3 441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forecasted as 0, as it is a non cash expense 101% 100% 91% 90%
SG&A and Other (1 909) (1 899) (2 361) (2 514) (2 432) (2 311) (2 213) (2 130) (2 057) (1 994) (1 937) (1 887) (1 841) (1 798) (1 755) (1 771) (1 730) (1 690) (1 650)
% of revenues 9% 9% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Depreciation (206) (199) (191) (203) (219) (208) (199) (192) (185) (180) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (173) (173)
% of net PP&E 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Amortization 0 0 0 (4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forecasted at 0 due to immateriality
Media Networks Core Result Before Tax (EBIT) 6 436 6 625 6 634 7 912 8 057 7 655 7 324 7 043 6 796 6 580 6 387 6 211 6 050 5 900 5 755 5 560 5 429 5 303 5 181
Media Networks Tax (2 234) (1 657) (1 504) (1 931) (2 530) (2 404) (2 300) (2 211) (2 134) (2 066) (2 005) (1 950) (1 900) (1 852) (1 807) (1 746) (1 705) (1 665) (1 627)
Media Networks Core Result After Tax 4 202 4 968 5 130 5 981 5 527 5 251 5 024 4 831 4 662 4 514 4 381 4 261 4 150 4 047 3 948 3 814 3 724 3 638 3 554
20,13%
Parks, Experiences and Products
Revenue from Parks, Experiences and Products 23 024 24 701 26 225 16 502 24 368 29 159 32 011 34 032 36 300 38 654 40 414 42 255 44 152 46 001 47 889 49 848 51 853 53 908 55 845
Theme park admissions 6 504 7 183 7 540 4 038 7 236 9 066 9 897 10 565 11 168 11 806 12 479 13 189 13 933 14 643 15 381 16 150 16 952 17 792 18 673
forecasted in drivers PE&P
Resort and vacations 5 378 5938 6266 3402 5 189 6 244 7 275 7 761 8 611 9 495 9 731 9 972 10 220 10 474 10 734 11 001 11 275 11 555 11 842
forecasted in drivers PE&P
Parks & Experiences Merchandise, food and beverage 5 154 5 674 5 963 3 441 5 724 7 172 7 829 8 357 8 835 9 339 9 872 10 433 11 022 11 584 12 168 12 776 13 410 14 075 14 565
% of Theme Park Admissions revenues 79% 79% 79% 85% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 78%
Merchandise Licensing and retail 4 494 4 249 4 519 4 185 4 337 4 490 4 651 4 815 4 984 5 157 5 334 5 516 5 703 5 894 6 091 6 293 6 500 6 713 6 933
World population and inflation growth 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Parks licencing and other 1 494 1 657 1 937 1 436 1 881 2 187 2 359 2 534 2 701 2 857 2 997 3 145 3 273 3 406 3 516 3 629 3 715 3 773 3 832
forecasted in drivers PE&P
Operating Expenses (12 455) (13 326) (14 015) (11 485) (12 323) (14 005) (15 111) (15 887) (16 241) (17 085) (17 727) (18 396) (19 082) (19 759) (20 449) (21 162) (21 890) (22 634) (23 367)
Operating Labor (5 412) (5 937) (6 174) (4 870) (5 087) (5 288) (5 501) (5 666) (5 807) (5 951) (6 099) (6 252) (6 407) (6 567) (6 731) (6 899) (7 072) (7 248) (7 429)
forecasted in drivers PE&P
Sales and Distribution Costs (2 670) (2 764) (2 918) (2 202) (2 711) (3 244) (3 562) (3 787) (4 039) (4 301) (4 497) (4 702) (4 913) (5 118) (5 329) (5 547) (5 770) (5 998) (6 214)
% of revenues 12% 11% 11% 13% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
Infrastructure Costs (2 259) (2 370) (2 469) (2 422) (2 244) (2 744) (3 053) (3 251) (3 492) (3 740) (3 898) (4 062) (4 230) (4 393) (4 558) (4 729) (4 901) (5 075) (5 256)
% of specific revenues 17% 16% 16% 27% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Supplies, Commissions, Entertainment Offerings and Others (2 114) (2 255) (2 454) (1 991) (2 280) (2 729) (2 995) (3 185) (2 904) (3 092) (3 233) (3 380) (3 532) (3 680) (3 831) (3 988) (4 148) (4 313) (4 468)
% of revenues 9% 9% 9% 12% 9% 9% 9% 9% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
SG&A and Other (2 896) (2 930) (3 133) (2 642) (2 911) (3 484) (3 808) (4 032) (4 282) (4 552) (4 751) (4 959) (5 173) (5 381) (5 592) (5 811) (6 034) (6 262) (6 476)
% of revenues 13% 12% 12% 16% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Depreciation (2 050) (2 217) (2 198) (2 328) (2 290) (2 450) (2 695) (2 884) (3 172) (3 490) (3 734) (3 958) (4 196) (4 439) (4 687) (4 941) (5 197) (5 457) (5 719)
% of net PP&E 9% 9% 9% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Amortization (111) (110) (108) (109) (111) (115) (119) (125) (133) (142) (148) (155) (162) (169) (176) (183) (191) (198) (205)
% of intagibles 111% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Parks, Experience and Products Core Result Before Tax (EBIT) 5 512 6 118 6 771 (62) 6 733 9 106 10 278 11 104 12 470 13 385 14 053 14 787 15 539 16 253 16 985 17 752 18 540 19 356 20 077
Parks, Experiences and Products Core Tax (1 895) (1 523) (1 536) 15 (2 114) (2 859) (3 227) (3 487) (3 916) (4 203) (4 413) (4 643) (4 879) (5 103) (5 333) (5 574) (5 822) (6 078) (6 304)
Parks, Experiences and Products Core Result After Tax 3 617 4 595 5 235 (47) 4 619 6 247 7 050 7 618 8 554 9 182 9 640 10 144 10 659 11 150 11 652 12 178 12 719 13 278 13 773
Studio Entertainment
Revenue from Studio Entertainment 8 352 10 065 11 127 9 636 13 198 13 604 14 055 14 541 15 061 15 637 16 241 16 868 17 459 18 040 18 614 19 185 19 755 20 325 20 913
Theatrical distribution licensing 2 903 4 303 4 726 2 134 5 320 5 628 5 972 6 345 6 747 7 199 7 674 8 167 8 619 9 054 9 478 9 893 10 300 10 702 11 115
forecasted in drivers Studio
TV/SVOD distribution licensing 2 145 2 340 2 920 4 557 4 653 4 750 4 855 4 962 5 071 5 182 5 296 5 413 5 532 5 654 5 778 5 905 6 035 6 168 6 304
inflation rate 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Home entertainment 1 677 1 647 1 734 1 528 1 757 1 704 1 653 1 604 1 556 1 509 1 464 1 420 1 377 1 336 1 296 1 257 1 219 1 183 1 147
growth 15% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% -3%
Merchandise licensing & Other 1 627 1 775 1 747 1 417 1468 1520 1575 1630 1688 1746 1806 1868 1931 1996 2062 2131 2201 2273 2347
World population and inflation growth 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Revenue from Eliminations (159) (197) (378) (2 296) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operating Expenses (3 718) (4 449) (5 187) (4 619) (5 034) (5 145) (5 267) (5 390) (5 495) (5 606) (5 718) (5 832) (5 934) (6 033) (6 130) (6 225) (6 319) (6 413) (6 506)
Film Cost Amortization (2 562) (3 187) (3 762) (3 643) (3 457) (3 530) (3 607) (3 687) (3 768) (3 851) (3 936) (4 022) (4 111) (4 201) (4 293) (4 388) (4 484) (4 583) (4 684)
amortization per film released and inflation growth 320 290 314 607 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308
COGS & Distribution Costs (845) (931) (1 164) (836) (1 381) (1 409) (1 442) (1 477) (1 493) (1 511) (1 528) (1 545) (1 547) (1 544) (1 538) (1 527) (1 513) (1 496) (1 477)
% of revenues 10% 9% 10% 9% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7%
Payroll (311) (331) (261) (140) (196) (206) (217) (226) (235) (244) (254) (265) (276) (287) (298) (310) (321) (333) (346)
forecasted in drivers Studio
Expenses Eliminations 166 189 279 2 141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SG&A and Other (2 156) (2 493) (3 119) (2 369) (3 564) (3 585) (3 612) (3 642) (3 675) (3 714) (3 752) (3 787) (3 806) (3 815) (3 816) (3 808) (3 793) (3 770) (3 743)
% of revenues 26% 25% 28% 25% 27% 26% 26% 25% 24% 24% 23% 22% 22% 21% 21% 20% 19% 19% 18%
Depreciation (50) (55) (74) (87) (53) (74) (80) (78) (81) (84) (86) (90) (93) (97) (100) (104) (107) (111) (114)
% of net PP&E 9% 9% 9% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Amortization (65) (64) (61) (59) (75) (77) (80) (83) (86) (89) (92) (96) (99) (103) (106) (109) (112) (116) (119)
% of intagibles 4% 4% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Studio Entertainment Core Result Before Taxes (EBIT) 2 370 2 996 2 587 2 347 4 473 4 722 5 016 5 347 5 724 6 145 6 592 7 063 7 527 7 992 8 463 8 939 9 423 9 916 10 430
Studio Entertainment Core Taxes (742) (699) (565) (573) (1 405) (1 483) (1 575) (1 679) (1 797) (1 929) (2 070) (2 218) (2 363) (2 510) (2 657) (2 807) (2 959) (3 114) (3 275)
Studio Entertainment Core Result 1 628 2 297 2 022 1 774 3 068 3 240 3 441 3 668 3 926 4 215 4 522 4 845 5 163 5 483 5 805 6 132 6 464 6 802 7 155
Direct to Consumer & International
Revenues from Direct to Consumer & International 3 075 3 414 9 386 16 967 23 643 27 670 32 643 38 308 43 036 48 114 52 979 58 085 63 092 67 955 72 266 76 320 80 534 84 913 89 463
Affiliate fees 1 335 1 372 2 768 3 673 3 591 3 504 3 417 3 332 3 252 3 178 3 105 3 035 2 966 2 899 2 834 2 771 2 710 2 650 2 592
forecasted in drivers DTCI
Advertising 1 293 1 311 3 542 4 477 5 789 6 099 6 421 6 759 7 123 7 513 7 887 8 268 8 648 9 015 9 342 9 684 10 040 10 410 10 796
forecasted in drivers DTCI
TV/SVOD distribution licensing 0 105 482 745 592 471 374 298 237 188 150 119 95 75 60 47 38 30 24
forecasted in drivers DTCI
Subscription fees 447 168 2 115 7 645 13 670 17 595 22 431 27 920 32 424 37 236 41 838 46 663 51 384 55 966 60 029 63 817 67 747 71 823 76 051
forecasted in drivers DTCI
Merchandise licensing, Home entertainment & Other 0 458 479 427 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forecasted in drivers DTCI
Operating Expenses (1 983) (2 384) (8 540) (15 072) (18 637) (20 514) (22 688) (24 891) (26 516) (28 726) (30 598) (32 402) (33 943) (35 199) (36 335) (37 227) (38 876) (40 558) (42 275)
Programming and Production Costs (1 090) (1 209) (5 697) (11 051) (13 641) (15 411) (17 528) (19 804) (21 387) (23 430) (25 269) (27 123) (28 830) (30 373) (31 938) (33 349) (34 787) (36 254) (37 750)
% of total DTCI revenues 35% 35% 61% 60% 58% 56% 54% 52% 50% 49% 48% 47% 46% 45% 44% 44% 43% 43% 42%
Payroll (335) (363) (1 228) (1 255) (1 281) (1 308) (1 337) (1 367) (1 379) (1 585) (1 773) (1 960) (2 140) (2 304) (2 436) (2 571) (2 709) (2 850) (2 994)
forecasted in drivers DTCI
Other Operating Expenses (558) (812) (1 615) (2 766) (3 715) (3 794) (3 823) (3 721) (3 750) (3 711) (3 556) (3 318) (2 973) (2 523) (1 960) (1 307) (1 379) (1 454) (1 532)
% of total DTCI revenues 18,15% 23,78% 17,21% 17,71% 16% 14% 12% 10% 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2%
SG&A and Other (861) (1 003) (2 116) (4 201) (4 857) (5 408) (6 053) (6 721) (7 120) (7 479) (7 705) (8 448) (9 176) (9 883) (10 510) (11 100) (11 713) (12 350) (13 012)
28% 29% 23% 22% 20,5% 19,5% 18,5% 17,5% 16,5% 15,5% 14,5% 14,5% 14,5% 14,5% 14,5% 14,5% 14,5% 14,5% 14,5%
Depreciation (74) (106) (214) (348) (371) (431) (495) (564) (638) (714) (793) (872) (948) (1 018) (1 080) (1 132) (1 172) (1 219) (1 267)
% of PP&E 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Amortization (20) (79) (111) (112) (129) (142) (156) (170) (185) (200) (216) (231) (247) (262) (278) (292) (307) (323) (339)
% of Intagibles 1% 16% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Direct to Consumer & International Core Result Before Taxes (EBIT) 137 (158) (1 595) (2 766) (352) 1 176 3 250 5 962 8 577 10 996 13 667 16 132 18 777 21 592 24 062 26 569 28 467 30 464 32 570
Direct to Consumer & International Core Taxes 77 134 405 675 110 (369) (1 021) (1 872) (2 693) (3 453) (4 291) (5 065) (5 896) (6 780) (7 556) (8 343) (8 939) (9 566) (10 227)
Direct to Consumer & International Core Result 214 (24) (1 190) (2 091) (241) 807 2 230 4 090 5 884 7 543 9 375 11 067 12 881 14 812 16 507 18 226 19 528 20 898 22 343
Corporate
Depreciation (206) (181) (167) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174)
SG&A and Other (354) (535) (820) (643) (836) (656) (853) (669) (870) (682) (888) (696) (905) (710) (923) (724) (942) (739) (961)
Corporate Core Result Before Taxes (EBIT) (560) (716) (987) (817) (1 010) (830) (1 027) (843) (1 044) (856) (1 062) (870) (1 079) (884) (1 097) (898) (1 116) (913) (1 135)
Corporate Core Taxes 206 189 229 199 317 261 323 265 328 269 333 273 339 278 345 282 350 287 356
Corporate Core Result (354) (527) (758) (618) (693) (569) (705) (578) (716) (587) (728) (597) (740) (606) (753) (616) (766) (626) (778)
NON CORE OPERATIONS
Other Expenses (22) (28) (537) (899) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equity in the income of investees 320 (102) (103) 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651
Other Income 78 601 4 357 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038 1 038
Restructuring and Impairment Charges (98) (33) (1 183) (5 735) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amortization TFCF and Hulu intangible assets 0 0 (1 043) (1 921) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest Income 122 108 268 156 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206
% of investments 4% 4% 8% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Income from discontinued operations (includes tax expense of $35, $0 and $0, respectively) 0 0 687 (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32) (32)
Non Core Result Before Taxes 400 546 2 446 (6 742) 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863 1 863
Non Core Taxes (19) 1 713 (343) 513 (585) (585) (585) (585) (585) (585) (585) (585) (585) (585) (585) (585) (585) (585) (585)
Non Core Result Before OCI 381 2 259 2 103 (6 229) 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278
OCI 426 359 (2 879) 359 341 324 308 292 278 264 251 238 226 215 204 194 184 175 166
Non Core Result 807 2 618 (776) (5 870) 1 619 1 602 1 586 1 571 1 556 1 542 1 529 1 516 1 504 1 493 1 482 1 472 1 462 1 453 1 444
Financial
Short term Interest Expense (87) (108) (229) (156)
Interest Expense (420) (574) (1 017) (1 491) (960) (728) (510) (240) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Interest (507) (682) (1 246) (1 647) (960) (728) (510) (240) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial Tax 186 180 289 402 302 228 160 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financial Result After Taxes (321) (502) (957) (1 245) (659) (499) (350) (165) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Check 9 792 13 425 8 705 (2 115)
Comprehensive Income 9 792 13 425 8 705 (2 115) 13 241 16 078 18 276 21 034 23 867 26 409 28 719 31 236 33 618 36 378 38 641 41 206 43 133 45 444 47 491
 
 


































CORE INVESTED CAPITAL 2017FY 2018FY 2019FY 2020FY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024FY 2025FY 2026FY 2027FY 2028FY 2029FY 2030FY 2031FY 2032FY 2033FY 2034FY 2035FY
Media Networks
Operating Cash 426 438 497 568 538 511 489 471 455 441 428 417 407 397 388 379 370 362 353
% of revenues 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Accounts Receivable 5 446 5 612 8 888 7 787 7 374 7 008 6 710 6 459 6 238 6 045 5 873 5 721 5 582 5 450 5 322 5 199 5 078 4 960 4 842
days' sales 93 93 131 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Payroll and Employee Benefits (379) (452) (486) (427) (391) (364) (342) (324) (308) (293) (280) (268) (257) (246) (236) (225) (215) (205) (195)
% of employees 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Accounts Payable (3 243) (3 225) (5 886) (5 322) (4 952) (4 707) (4 508) (4 342) (4 195) (4 068) (3 953) (3 853) (3 761) (3 641) (3 524) (3 411) (3 300) (3 192) (3 085)
days' COGS 93 89 139 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 111 110 109 108 107 106
Total Core Current IC Media Networks 2 251 2 373 3 013 2 606 2 569 2 448 2 348 2 264 2 190 2 125 2 068 2 017 1 971 1 961 1 951 1 942 1 933 1 924 1 916
Television Costs Rights and Advances 2 696 2 810 12 497 10 201 9 410 8 943 8 562 8 242 7 961 7 715 7 495 7 301 7 123 6 956 6 792 6 634 6 481 6 329 6 180
regression coefficient 28% 28% 100% 70%
Net PP&E 2 263 2 131 2 122 2 074 2 433 2 312 2 214 2 131 2 058 1 995 1 938 1 936 1 935 1 936 1 935 1 933 1 931 1 928 1 923
%of revenue 11% 10% 9% 7% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 11% 11%
Intangible Assets, net 2 021 1 546 7 861 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242 7 242
Goodwill 16 325 15 989 33 423 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991 33 991
Total Core Non Current IC Media Networks 23 305 22 477 55 904 53 507 53 076 52 488 52 009 51 607 51 252 50 942 50 666 50 470 50 291 50 124 49 960 49 801 49 645 49 490 49 335
Parks, Experiences and Products
Operating Cash 460 494 525 330 487 583 640 681 726 773 808 845 883 920 958 997 1 037 1 078 1 117
% of revenues 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Inventories 1 373 1 392 1 649 1 583 1 725 1 552 1 674 1 760 1 799 1 893 1 964 2 038 2 114 2 189 2 265 2 344 2 425 2 508 2 589
% COGS 11% 10% 12% 14% 14% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
Accounts Receivable 1 149 1 088 1 618 1 148 1 307 1 353 1 402 1 451 1 502 1 554 1 608 1 662 1 719 1 776 1 836 1 896 1 959 2 023 2 089
days' sales 93 93 131 100 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
Other Current Assets Net of Restricted Cash and Derivative Positions 505 575 871 730 637 762 837 890 949 1 010 1 056 1 105 1 154 1 203 1 252 1 303 1 356 1 409 1 460
% of revenues 2% 2% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Deferred Revenue and Other (3 538) (3 694) (3 192) (1 510) (3 186) (3 925) (4 334) (4 551) (4 833) (5 120) (5 250) (5 382) (5 516) (5 635) (5 755) (5 875) (5 994) (6 115) (6 236)
% of specific revenues 30% 28% 23% 20% 26% 26% 25% 25% 24% 24% 24% 23% 23% 22% 22% 22% 21% 21% 20%
Payroll and Employee Benefits (1 364) (1 642) (2 258) (2 151) (1 767) (1 802) (1 838) (1 857) (1 866) (1 875) (1 885) (1 894) (1 904) (1 913) (1 923) (1 932) (1 942) (1 952) (1 961)
% of employees 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Accounts Payable (2 201) (2 214) (3 460) (2 271) (2 541) (3 037) (3 322) (3 505) (3 550) (3 757) (3 892) (4 032) (4 173) (4 307) (4 441) (4 579) (4 716) (4 855) (4 985)
days' COGS 114 109 161 125 128 127 126 125 124 123 122 121 120 119 118 117 116 115 114
Total Core Current IC Parks, Experiences and Products (3 616) (4 000) (4 248) (2 141) (3 337) (4 514) (4 941) (5 132) (5 273) (5 522) (5 590) (5 657) (5 722) (5 768) (5 808) (5 845) (5 876) (5 903) (5 928)
Net PP&E 22 518 23 746 24 425 23 783 25 447 27 229 29 952 32 048 35 253 38 778 41 493 43 982 46 621 49 325 52 088 54 900 57 755 60 643 63 554
% growth 5% 3% -3% 7% 7% 10% 7% 10% 10% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Goodwill 291 4 487 5 535 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550 5 550
Intangible Assets, net 100 3 167 3 122 3 066 3 127 3 221 3 350 3 517 3 752 3 995 4 177 4 367 4 563 4 754 4 950 5 152 5 359 5 572 5 772
% revenue growth and % growth 2% 3% 4% 5% 7% 6% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Total Core Non Current IC Parks, Experiences and Products 22 909 31 400 33 082 32 399 34 125 36 000 38 852 41 116 44 555 48 324 51 220 53 900 56 735 59 630 62 587 65 603 68 665 71 765 74 876
Studio Entertainment
Operating Cash 167 201 223 193 264 272 281 291 301 313 325 337 349 361 372 384 395 407 418
% of revenues 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Accounts Receivable 1 707 2 155 3 363 2 224 3 317 3 450 3 595 3 750 3 915 4 096 4 284 4 478 4 662 4 842 5 021 5 197 5 374 5 550 5 730
days' Sales 93 93 131 100 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106
Deferred revenue and Other (499) (464) (401) (310) (475) (460) (447) (433) (420) (408) (395) (384) (372) (361) (350) (340) (329) (320) (310)
% of specific revenues 30% 28% 23% 20% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27%
Payroll and Employee Benefits (33) (42) (45) (24) (27) (28) (29) (29) (30) (30) (31) (31) (32) (32) (33) (34) (34) (35) (35)
% of employees 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Accounts Payable (1 065) (1 234) (2 174) (1 538) (1 699) (1 721) (1 745) (1 771) (1 790) (1 809) (1 829) (1 848) (1 863) (1 876) (1 888) (1 899) (1 909) (1 918) (1 927)
days' COGS 114 109 161 125 128 127 126 125 124 123 122 121 120 119 118 117 116 115 114
Total Core Current IC Studio Entertainment 277 617 965 544 1 380 1 513 1 656 1 808 1 977 2 161 2 354 2 553 2 745 2 934 3 122 3 309 3 496 3 684 3 876
Net PP&E 549 589 822 889 872 899 929 961 995 1 033 1 073 1 114 1 153 1 192 1 230 1 267 1 305 1 343 1 382
% of revenue 7% 6% 7% 9% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
Theatrical Film Costs Advances 5 164 5 455 9 554 10 192 10 916 11 690 12 519 13 407 14 357 15 374 16 462 17 627 18 864 20 181 21 584 23 076 24 663 26 351 28 146
% growth 6% 75% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
Intangible Assets, net 1 543 1 479 2 085 2 031 2 092 2 156 2 228 2 305 2 387 2 478 2 574 2 674 2 767 2 859 2 950 3 041 3 131 3 222 3 315
% revenue growth -4% 41% -3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Goodwill 6 817 7 094 17 797 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795 17 795
Total Core Non Current IC Studio Entertainment 14 073 14 617 30 258 30 907 31 674 32 540 33 471 34 467 35 534 36 680 37 904 39 210 40 580 42 027 43 559 45 179 46 895 48 711 50 637
Direct to Consumer & International
Operating Cash 62 68 188 339 441 573 631 694 763 840 924 1 016 1 118 1 229 1 352 1 487 1 636 1 800 1 980
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Accounts Receivable 331 480 1 612 1 549 1 596 1 644 1 693 1 744 1 796 1 850 1 905 1 963 2 022 2 082 2 145 2 209 2 275 2 343 2 414
days' dales 93 93 131 100 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Deferred revenue and Other (531) (434) (1 129) (2 296) (3 416) (4 070) (4 857) (5 716) (6 347) (6 987) (7 546) (8 096) (8 582) (9 000) (9 297) (9 515) (9 716) (9 897) (10 058)
% of revenues 30% 28% 23% 20% 20% 19% 19% 18% 18% 17% 17% 16% 16% 15% 15% 14% 14% 13% 13%
Payroll and Employee Benefits (43) (54) (221) (322) (183) (183) (183) (183) (181) (204) (223) (241) (258) (272) (281) (290) (299) (308) (316)
1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Accounts Payable (515) (605) (3 227) (4 744) (4 497) (4 870) (5 298) (5 715) (5 879) (6 120) (6 254) (6 341) (6 345) (6 269) (6 154) (5 969) (5 750) (5 496) (5 206)
days' COGS 114 109 161 125 120 115 110 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50
Total Core Current IC DTCI (696) (545) (2 777) (5 474) (6 059) (6 906) (8 014) (9 176) (9 847) (10 621) (11 194) (11 700) (12 046) (12 229) (12 236) (12 079) (11 854) (11 558) (11 187)
Net PP&E 813 1 135 2 378 3 555 4 124 4 784 5 501 6 272 7 087 7 937 8 810 9 691 10 535 11 314 12 004 12 581 13 021 13 542 14 083
% growth 16% 16% 15% 14% 13% 12% 11% 10% 9% 7% 6% 5% 4% 4% 4%
Television Costs Rights and Advances 899 937 5 356 6 800 12 319 14 417 17 008 19 959 22 423 25 069 27 603 30 264 32 872 35 406 37 652 39 764 41 960 44 242 46 612
Intangible Assets, net 3 201 490 9 962 6 814 7 836 8 620 9 482 10 335 11 265 12 166 13 140 14 059 15 044 15 946 16 903 17 765 18 671 19 623 20 624
% growth 15% 10% 10% 9% 9% 8% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Goodwill 4 393 3 699 23 538 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353 20 353
Total Core Non Current IC DTCI 9 306 6 261 41 234 37 523 44 632 48 173 52 344 56 919 61 128 65 525 69 906 74 367 78 804 83 019 86 912 90 463 94 005 97 760 101 673
Corporate
Net PP&E 2 263 1 939 1 856 1 778 1 831 1 886 1 942 2 001 2 061 2 123 2 186 2 252 2 319 2 389 2 461 2 534 2 610 2 689 2 769
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Intangible Assets, net 130 130 185 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total Core Invested Capital 70 201 75 268 159 471 151 667 159 911 163 648 169 686 175 893 183 596 191 758 199 540 207 432 215 696 224 108 232 528 240 928 249 539 258 581 267 988
NON-CORE INVESTED CAPITAL
Investments 3 202 2 899 3 224 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903 3 903
Other assets Net of Derivative Instruments and Restriced Cash 2 364 3 321 4 562 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397 8 397
Restricted Cash Posted as Collateral for Derivative Instruments 47 5 37 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Net Derivative Positions (136) (60) 166 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Deferred income taxes (4 480) (3 109) (7 902) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288) (7 288)
Other long-term liabilities (2 972) (3 692) (8 774) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753) (10 753)
Unallocated Goodwill 3 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pension and postretirement medical plan liabilities (3 281) (2 712) (4 783) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451) (6 451)
Total Non Core Invested Capital (1 656) (3 348) (13 470) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068)
Total Invested Capital 68 545 71 920 146 001 139 599 147 843 151 580 157 618 163 825 171 528 179 690 187 472 195 364 203 628 212 040 220 460 228 860 237 471 246 513 255 920
FINANCING
Excess Cash 2 902 2 948 3 987 16 484 0 0 0 0 1 867 14 409 29 142 45 741 63 836 83 948 105 828 129 740 154 953 181 548 209 384
Current portion of borrowings, Net of Derivative Instruments, including leases (6 047) (3 687) (8 861) (5 654)
Borrowings, including leases (19 248) (17 226) (38 275) (52 917) (36 563) (27 702) (19 418) (9 138) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Redeemable noncontrolling interests (1 148) (1 123) (8 963) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249) (9 249)
Net Financial Assets (23 541) (19 088) (52 112) (51 336) (45 812) (36 951) (28 667) (18 387) (7 382) 5 160 19 893 36 492 54 587 74 699 96 579 120 491 145 704 172 299 200 135
Equity
Common Stock 36 248 36 779 53 907 54 497
Retained Earnings 72 606 82 679 42 494 38 315
Accumulated other comprehensive loss (3 528) (3 097) (6 617) (8 322)
Treasury Stock (64 011) (67 588) (907) (907)
Total Disney Shareholders' equity 41 315 48 773 88 877 83 583 96 824 108 777 122 365 138 003 155 748 175 382 196 734 219 956 244 950 271 996 300 725 331 360 363 428 397 214 432 522
Noncontrolling interests (3 689) (4 059) (5 012) (4 680) (5 207) (5 851) (6 586) (7 434) (8 399) (9 468) (10 631) (11 899) (13 264) (14 743) (16 314) (17 991) (19 747) (21 598) (23 532)
Total Equity 45 004 52 832 93 889 88 263 102 031 114 628 128 951 145 437 164 146 184 849 207 365 231 855 258 214 286 739 317 039 349 351 383 175 418 812 456 055
 
 


































$ millions 2017FY 2018FY 2019FY 2020FY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024FY 2025FY 2026FY 2027FY 2028FY 2029FY 2030FY 2031FY 2032FY 2033FY 2034FY 2035FY
OPERATING ACTIVITIES
NOPLAT 9 306 11 309 10 438 5 000 12 280 14 975 17 040 19 629 22 311 24 867 27 190 29 719 32 114 34 885 37 159 39 734 41 670 43 991 46 047
Depreciation and amortization (2 782) (3 011) (3 124) (3 424) (3 422) (3 671) (3 999) (4 270) (4 655) (5 072) (5 419) (5 750) (6 094) (6 436) (6 776) (7 109) (7 434) (7 770) (8 111)
Gross Cash Flow From Operations 12 088 14 320 13 562 8 424 15 702 18 646 21 039 23 899 26 966 29 939 32 609 35 470 38 207 41 321 43 935 46 843 49 104 51 761 54 158
Media Networks
NWC 2 251 2 373 3 013 2 606 2 569 2 448 2 348 2 264 2 190 2 125 2 068 2 017 1 971 1 961 1 951 1 942 1 933 1 924 1 916
Cash Flow in Net Working Capital (122) (640) 407 37 121 100 84 74 65 58 51 46 10 10 9 9 9 9
Parks, Experiences and Products
NWC (3 616) (4 000) (4 248) (2 141) (3 337) (4 514) (4 941) (5 132) (5 273) (5 522) (5 590) (5 657) (5 722) (5 768) (5 808) (5 845) (5 876) (5 903) (5 928)
Cash Flow in Net Working Capital 384 247 (2 106) 1 195 1 177 427 191 141 249 68 67 65 45 41 36 32 27 25
Studio Entertainment
NWC 277 617 965 544 1 380 1 513 1 656 1 808 1 977 2 161 2 354 2 553 2 745 2 934 3 122 3 309 3 496 3 684 3 876
Cash Flow in Net Working Capital (341) (348) 421 (836) (132) (143) (152) (169) (185) (192) (199) (192) (189) (188) (187) (187) (187) (193)
Direct to Consumer & International
NWC (696) (545) (2 777) (5 474) (6 059) (6 906) (8 014) (9 176) (9 847) (10 621) (11 194) (11 700) (12 046) (12 229) (12 236) (12 079) (11 854) (11 558) (11 187)
Cash Flow in Net Working Capital (151) 2 232 2 697 585 846 1 109 1 162 671 774 573 506 346 183 7 (157) (225) (296) (371)
Total NWC (1 785) (1 555) (3 047) (4 466) (5 447) (7 459) (8 952) (10 236) (10 954) (11 856) (12 362) (12 787) (13 053) (13 102) (12 971) (12 672) (12 301) (11 853) (11 323)
Total Cash Flow in Net Working Capital 0 (230) 1 492 1 419 981 2 013 1 492 1 285 717 903 506 425 266 49 (131) (299) (371) (448) (530)
Media Networks
Total Core Non Current IC Media Networks 2 696 2 810 12 497 10 201 9 410 8 943 8 562 8 242 7 961 7 715 7 495 7 301 7 123 6 956 6 792 6 634 6 481 6 329 6 180
Cash Flow (114) (9 687) 2 297 791 467 380 320 281 246 220 193 178 167 164 158 154 151 150
PP&E
Net PP&E 2 263 2 131 2 122 2 074 2 433 2 312 2 214 2 131 2 058 1 995 1 938 1 936 1 935 1 936 1 935 1 933 1 931 1 928 1 923
Period Depreciation (206) (199) (191) (203) (219) (208) (199) (192) (185) (180) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (173) (173)
Net Capital Expenditure Cash Flow (68) (182) (154) (578) (87) (101) (109) (112) (116) (118) (172) (174) (174) (173) (173) (172) (170) (168)
Parks, Experiences and Products
PP&E
Net PP&E 22 518 23 746 24 425 23 783 25 447 27 229 29 952 32 048 35 253 38 778 41 493 43 982 46 621 49 325 52 088 54 900 57 755 60 643 63 554
Period Depreciation (2 050) (2 217) (2 198) (2 328) (2 290) (2 450) (2 695) (2 884) (3 172) (3 490) (3 734) (3 958) (4 196) (4 439) (4 687) (4 941) (5 197) (5 457) (5 719)
Net Capital Expenditure Cash Flow (3 444) (2 877) (1 686) (3 955) (4 232) (5 418) (4 981) (6 377) (7 015) (6 448) (6 448) (6 834) (7 143) (7 450) (7 753) (8 052) (8 345) (8 630)
Studio Entertainment
Total Core Non Current IC Studio Entertainment 5 164 5 455 9 554 10 192 10 916 11 690 12 519 13 407 14 357 15 374 16 462 17 627 18 864 20 181 21 584 23 076 24 663 26 351 28 146
Cash Flow (291) (4 099) (638) (724) (775) (829) (888) (950) (1 017) (1 088) (1 165) (1 237) (1 317) (1 402) (1 492) (1 587) (1 688) (1 795)
PP&E
Net PP&E 549 589 822 889 872 899 929 961 995 1 033 1 073 1 114 1 153 1 192 1 230 1 267 1 305 1 343 1 382
Period Depreciation (50) (55) (74) (87) (53) (74) (80) (78) (81) (84) (86) (90) (93) (97) (100) (104) (107) (111) (114)
Net Capital Expenditure Cash Flow (95) (307) (153) (36) (101) (110) (111) (115) (122) (126) (131) (132) (135) (138) (142) (145) (148) (153)
Direct to Consumer & International
Total Core Non Current IC DTCI 899 937 5 356 6 800 12 319 14 417 17 008 19 959 22 423 25 069 27 603 30 264 32 872 35 406 37 652 39 764 41 960 44 242 46 612
Cash Flow (38) (4 419) (1 445) (5 518) (2 098) (2 591) (2 952) (2 463) (2 646) (2 535) (2 660) (2 609) (2 534) (2 246) (2 113) (2 196) (2 282) (2 371)
PP&E
Net PP&E 813 1 135 2 378 3 555 4 124 4 784 5 501 6 272 7 087 7 937 8 810 9 691 10 535 11 314 12 004 12 581 13 021 13 542 14 083
Period Depreciation (74) (106) (214) (348) (371) (431) (495) (564) (638) (714) (793) (872) (948) (1 018) (1 080) (1 132) (1 172) (1 219) (1 267)
Net Capital Expenditure Cash Flow (428) (1 457) (1 525) (940) (1 090) (1 213) (1 335) (1 453) (1 565) (1 666) (1 753) (1 791) (1 798) (1 770) (1 708) (1 612) (1 739) (1 809)
Corporate
Net PP&E 2 263 1 939 1 856 1 778 1 831 1 886 1 942 2 001 2 061 2 123 2 186 2 252 2 319 2 389 2 461 2 534 2 610 2 689 2 769
Period Depreciation (206) (181) (167) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174) (174)
Cash Flow 143 (84) (96) (227) (229) (231) (232) (234) (236) (238) (240) (242) (244) (246) (248) (250) (252) (255)
Cash Flow of Other Operating Net Assets Excluding PP&E (443) (18 205) 214 (5 451) (2 406) (3 040) (3 519) (3 132) (3 416) (3 403) (3 632) (3 667) (3 684) (3 485) (3 447) (3 629) (3 819) (4 016)
Cash Flow From PP&E Activities (3 892) (4 907) (3 615) (5 736) (5 739) (7 072) (6 767) (8 292) (9 053) (8 596) (8 744) (9 173) (9 494) (9 777) (10 024) (10 231) (10 655) (11 015)
Free Cash Flow Before Goodwill 9 755 (8 058) 6 443 5 496 12 514 12 419 14 897 16 259 18 373 21 116 23 519 25 632 28 193 30 542 33 073 34 873 36 840 38 597
Investment in Goodwill & Intangibles Assets (3 513) (65 707) 6 362 (1 459) (1 275) (1 417) (1 476) (1 651) (1 667) (1 708) (1 692) (1 783) (1 720) (1 803) (1 739) (1 813) (1 891) (1 957)
Free Cash Flow After Goodwill 6 242 (73 765) 12 805 4 036 11 238 11 002 13 421 14 607 16 706 19 408 21 827 23 850 26 473 28 739 31 334 33 059 34 948 36 640
NON-OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Non Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes 381 2 259 2 103 (6 229) 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278
Amortization TFCF and Hulu intangible assets 0 0 1 043 1 921 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gross Cash Flow from Non-Operating Activities 381 2 259 1 060 (8 150) 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278 1 278
Total Non Core Invested Capital (1 656) (3 348) (13 470) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068) (12 068)
Cash Flow of Other Non Operating Assets 1 692 10 122 (1 402) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OCI 426 359 (2 879) 359 341 324 308 292 278 264 251 238 226 215 204 194 184 175 166
Non Operating cash flow 807 4 310 9 346 (7 272) 1 619 1 602 1 586 1 571 1 556 1 542 1 529 1 516 1 504 1 493 1 482 1 472 1 462 1 453 1 444
Unlevered Free Cash Flow 807 10 552 (64 419) 5 532 5 655 12 840 12 588 14 992 16 163 18 248 20 937 23 344 25 354 27 966 30 221 32 806 34 522 36 402 38 084
Tax Shield 186 180 289 402 302 228 160 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Levered Free Cash Flow (Cash flow available to investors) 993 10 732 (64 130) 5 934 5 957 13 069 12 748 15 067 16 163 18 248 20 937 23 344 25 354 27 966 30 221 32 806 34 522 36 402 38 084
FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Short term Interest Expense (87) (108) (229) (156) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest Expense (420) (574) (1 017) (1 491) (960) (728) (510) (240) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Financial Assets (23 541) (19 088) (52 112) (51 336) (45 812) (36 951) (28 667) (18 387) (7 382) 5 160 19 893 36 492 54 587 74 699 96 579 120 491 145 704 172 299 200 135
Cash Flow From Net Debt (5 135) 31 778 (2 423) (6 484) (9 588) (8 794) (10 519) (11 005) (12 542) (14 734) (16 598) (18 095) (20 112) (21 880) (23 912) (25 213) (26 595) (27 836)
Total Comprehensive Income 9 792 13 425 8 705 (2 115) 13 241 16 078 18 276 21 034 23 867 26 409 28 719 31 236 33 618 36 378 38 641 41 206 43 133 45 444 47 491
Equity 41 315 48 773 88 877 83 583 96 824 108 777 122 365 138 003 155 748 175 382 196 734 219 956 244 950 271 996 300 725 331 360 363 428 397 214 432 522
Noncontrolling interests (3 689) (4 059) (5 012) (4 680) (5 207) (5 851) (6 586) (7 434) (8 399) (9 468) (10 631) (11 899) (13 264) (14 743) (16 314) (17 991) (19 747) (21 598) (23 532)
Transactions with Shareholders (5 967) 31 399 (3 179) 0 (4 125) (4 688) (5 396) (6 123) (6 775) (7 367) (8 013) (8 624) (9 332) (9 913) (10 571) (11 065) (11 658) (12 183)
Financing FCF (10 732) 64 130 (5 934) (5 957) (13 069) (12 748) (15 067) (16 163) (18 248) (20 937) (23 344) (25 354) (27 966) (30 221) (32 806) (34 522) (36 402) (38 084)
 
 








Disclosures and Disclaimers 
 
Report  Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
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Germany: Pursuant to §34c of the WpHG (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, i.e., the German Securities Trading 
Act), this entity is not required to register with or otherwise notify the Bundesanstalt für 
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Students are free to choose the target companies of the reports. Therefore, Nova SBE may start covering 
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